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Managerial accounting researchers and practitioners are increasingly concerned 
with the effects of formal organizational controls on agent behavior. This three-paper 
dissertation extends this line of research by experimentally examining the effects of 
monitoring intensity on three important work behaviors which, generally, are not directly 
observable by the organizational control system: discretionary effort, problem solving 
ability, and honesty. Together, these studies help fill a gap in the managerial accounting 
literature by examining the relationship between the monitoring environment and agent 
behavior.  
 The principal-agent theory of the firm suggests that tighter monitoring by the 
principal will increase the agent’s work effort at best, and have no effect at worst. 
However, the psychology literature suggests that monitoring may actually reduce effort 
by “crowding out” an individual’s intrinsic motivation to perform unmeasured or 
unrewarded work related tasks. In Paper 1, I test for the crowding out effect of 
monitoring and find mixed results.  
 In Paper 2, I investigate the effects of monitoring intensity on various aspects of 
problem solving ability and creativity. Past research suggests that strict environmental 
controls can have detrimental effects on creative thinking. I extend this line of literature 
by investigating how monitoring affects an individual’s problem solving ability. In 




 In Paper 3, I investigate how monitoring intensity affects an individual’s 
propensity toward dishonesty using a 3x2 experimental design where the participants are 
given a simple task, with a monetary reward based on performance, in one of the three 
monitoring treatments—trust, human monitoring, or electronic monitoring—and in one 
of two outcome reporting regimes—self-report or verified. I find an inverted-U shape 
relationship between monitoring intensity and dishonesty, where dishonesty is highest 
under human monitoring.  
 Organizations are increasing their use of all types of surveillance and controls, 
and, in general, trust is increasingly discouraged within organizations. These papers add 
to the managerial accounting literature by shedding light on how different monitoring 
environments can change human behavior. This line of research can only increase in 
importance as regulation increases and monitoring technology becomes more advanced, 






 This three-paper dissertation experimentally examines the effects of monitoring 
intensity on three important work behaviors which are, generally, unobservable by the 
organizational control system: discretionary effort, problem solving, and honesty. The 
three studies are written as independent chapters for potential publication, each of which 
has been submitted to the American Accounting Association’s Annual Meeting and other 
academic conferences. As a result there may be repetition of some information in the 
studies. 
 The three experiments that comprise this dissertation were done in one sitting for 
each participant. Twelve sessions were held in a computer lab at a large public university. 
Each session contained either 9 or 10 participants. A total of 114 individuals participated, 
earning an average of $15.15. The total payout to participants was $1,728.      
 At the end of this dissertation there is a general conclusion. The general 
conclusion ties the three studies together and discusses the implications of the dissertation 
as a whole. The implications of each study also are discussed in a conclusion section at 
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This three-paper dissertation experimentally examines the effects of monitoring 
intensity on three important work behaviors which, generally, are not directly observable 
by the organizational control system: discretionary effort, problem solving, and honesty. 
The basis of this research is that most individuals, by default, are internally motivated to 
exert effort in order to perform a fair exchange, be honest, and utilize complex problem 
solving skills. However, control mechanisms can crowd out the internal motivation to be 
fair and honest by lowering the individual’s propensity toward reciprocity (  chter and 
Falk 2002) or by lowering the individual’s threshold for dishonesty.
1
 Additionally, 
controls may increase work-related stress which can negatively influence problem 
solving skills (e.g., Hennesey and Amabile 1998; Elsbach and Hargadon 2006). These 
effects may be more pronounced when the control system is perceived by the agent as 
being intrusive, overly controlling, or unnecessary (Stanton 2000).  
 Often the terms monitoring and control are used interchangeably in the business 
literature. However, most formal definitions of the two terms view monitoring as one part 
of the control system. Tosi et al. (1997, 588) defined monitoring as “observation of an 
agent’s effort or outcomes that is accomplished through supervision, accounting controls, 
and other devices.” Monitoring, alone, is void of any rewards, punishments, or corrective 
actions. Koontz and O'Donnell (1955, 103), in the classic book Principles of 
Management, describe control as “the measurement and correction of performance in 
order to make sure that enterprise objectives and the plans devised to attain them are 
                                                        
 1 Research has shown that individuals’ preference for honesty often depends on environmental 
factors (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Belot and Schröder 2013). 
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accomplished.” Through monitoring, effort and/or outcomes are observed and measured. 
Monitoring becomes part of the organizational control system when these observations 
and measurements are used to influence future performance. Thus, the control system can 
be broken up into two parts, monitoring (measurement or observation) and control 
(corrective actions, rewards, threats, compensation scheme, etc.), and each part can be 
studied separately. In these studies, I consider the effects of monitoring intensity on 
certain aspects of behavior while holding the other parts of the control system constant.  
 The three experiments that comprise this dissertation were done in one sitting for 
each participant. Twelve sessions were held in a computer lab at a large public university. 
Each session contained either 9 or 10 participants, with a total of 114 individuals 
participating. Each session was pre-assigned one of three monitoring treatments, trust 
monitoring (low), human monitoring (medium), or electronic monitoring (high), and 
separately, one of two reporting treatments, self-report or verified, for the Task 3. Each 
participant was assigned to one treatment group and performed three tasks, with each task 
representing a new experiment. 
 My first study looks at the effects on monitoring intensity on discretionary effort. 
The principal-agent theory of the firm suggests that tighter monitoring by the principal 
will increase the agent’s work effort at best, and have no effect at worst. However, 
standard principal-agent theory doesn’t consider the effects of monitoring on agent work 
behaviors that falls outside of the control system, such as discretionary effort or voluntary 
effort. The psychology literature suggests that monitoring may actually reduce such effort 
by “crowding out” an individual’s intrinsic motivation to perform unmeasured or 
unrewarded work. Accordingly, I hypothesize that as monitoring increases across groups, 
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discretionary effort and voluntary effort will decrease. The details of the study, results, 
and implications are discussed in Chapter 2. 
 In the second study I investigate the effects of monitoring intensity on various 
aspects of problem solving ability and creativity. Past research suggests that strict 
environmental controls can have detrimental effects on creative thinking, which is critical 
for finding the optimal solution to complex problems. I test this proposition and I extend 
this line of literature by investigating how monitoring affects an individual’s ability to 
establish and use a pattern solution, recognize when a pattern solution is no longer 
efficient, and solve complex problems. The details of the study, results, and implications 
are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 In the third study I investigate how monitoring intensity affects an individual’s 
propensity toward behavioral dishonesty. This variable is operationalized by splitting 
each monitoring treatment in to two subgroups. Each group is given the same simple 
puzzle, with monetary compensation tied to performance. One group self-reported their 
performance, while the other group had their performance checked.
2
 Past research has 
shown that individuals are very prone to reciprocal behavior, with such behavior 
extending into the principal-agent context. I hypothesize that as monitoring increases 
across groups, dishonesty will also increase. The details of the study, results, and 
implications are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Organizations are increasing their use of all types of surveillance and controls, 
and, in general, trust is increasingly discouraged within organizations. These papers add 
to the managerial accounting literature by shedding light on how individuals react to 
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various levels of monitoring and extend a larger body of research that is concerned with 
the effects of formal controls on behavior within organizations (e.g., Christ et al. 2012). 
Specifically, this research is concerned with the potential “hidden costs of monitoring” 
which may arise during the organizational control process. This line of research can only 
increase in importance as regulation increases and monitoring technology becomes more, 
advanced, reliable, and accessible. 
 Because of the complexity of the individual psyche and the vast number of 
uncontrollable factors in organizational settings, investigations into the effects of 
monitoring on individual behavior are well-suited for laboratory experiments. The results 
of these experiments are not meant to be directly generalizable outside of a laboratory 
setting. Rather, these experiments, and their results, should be considered in the larger 









THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING INTENSITY ON DISCRETIONARY TASK 
EFFORT, VOLUNTEER RATES FOR OPTIONAL TASKS,  
AND EFFORT ON OPTIONAL TASKS 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Principal-Agent theory of the firm suggests that tighter monitoring by the 
principal will increase the agent’s work effort (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) at best, and 
have no effect at worst. In contrast, the psychology literature suggests that monitoring 
may actually reduce effort by “crowding out” an individual’s intrinsic motivation to 
perform a task (Frey 199 ) or to be “fair” to the principal (  chter and  alk 2  2). The 
agency theory and the “crowding out” literature are not necessarily contradictory if one 
considers that most principal-agent relationships involve some effort that is monitored by 
the principal, and some effort that cannot be, or is not, monitored (Hölmstrom 1979; 
Bernheim and Whinston 1998; Hecht et al. 2012). Building on these ideas, I attempt to 
reconcile the agency theory literature and the human motivation literature by 
distinguishing between the monitored aspects of a task, in which external controls may 
substitute for internal motivation, and the less monitored discretionary and optional 
aspects of a task, in which external controls may not substitute for internal motivation. I 
hypothesize that increasing task-monitoring (external control) will increase effort on the 
monitored aspects of a task at the expense of discretionary or voluntary aspects of the 
task. Accordingly, this paper fills a gap in the managerial literature by experimentally 
examining the relationship between task-monitoring intensity and three different work 
behaviors generally associated with internal motivation: discretionary effort on a 
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mandatory task, volunteer rates for a work-related optional task, and effort exerted on the 
optional task. 
 I used a laboratory experiment where the participants, 114 in total, were assigned 
to one of three different monitoring treatment groups, electronic monitoring, human 
monitoring, or trust (no monitoring). They were then asked to perform the clerical task of 
cross-checking paper invoices with error-riddled transcriptions of the data, which had 
been pre-entered into a spreadsheet. Each treatment group performed the clerical task for 
a flat wage. The only task instruction for the participants was that they must correct 
records for the entire work period to receive the flat wage. No direct instructions 
pertaining to work quality or work quantity were given, leaving both to the discretion of 
the worker. However, quantity was more observable by the monitoring than quality, 
making quality more discretionary. After the task, and during a short free-time break, the 
participants were solicited for optional feedback. On the clerical task, work task quantity 
and work task quality (representing discretionary effort) were measured, while on the 
optional feedback task, volunteer rates for the optional task and task completion rates 
(representing effort spent on the optional task) were measured.  
 As discussed by Frey (1993), it is possible that, under certain conditions, 
increasing monitoring may actually reduce agent effort by simultaneously lowering the 
marginal cost of shirking and increasing the marginal cost of effort to the agent. Such 
conditions abound when the monitoring is imperfect, providing an opportunity to 
decrease effort, and the agent is psychologically affected by the monitoring or the change 
in relationship with the principal, prompting a decrease in motivation. In this research, I 
hypothesize that the more monitored an individual feels, the less obligated, and less 
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motivated, the individual will feel to perform tasks that are not directly monitored or 
measured by the control system, as compared to individuals who do not feel intensely 
monitored. I find evidence to support this hypothesis when examining monitoring 
intensity and discretionary effort (work quality) on a mandatory task. In this experiment, 
work quality was higher when monitoring intensity was low. However, I find a more 
complex relationship between monitoring intensity and optional tasks. Contrary to my 
hypothesis, I find evidence, through higher volunteer rates, that monitoring intensity is 
positively associated with the propensity to work on tasks that are presented as optional. 
However, I also find that monitoring intensity is negatively related to effort spent on the 
“optional” task once an individual volunteers to do it. This paradox likely manifests 
because individuals, having been monitored in the previous task, still feel controlled. This 
feeling of being controlled compels them to volunteer for the optional task, but they have 
less internal motivation to sustain effort toward, or complete, the optional task.  
 Most work-related tasks are not intrinsically motivated, but are to some degree 
externally motivated. Activities that are not intrinsically motivating require extrinsic 
motivation, so their initial enactment depends upon the perception of a contingency 
between the behavior and a desired consequence. However, when certain conditions are 
met, individuals will adopt the actions, or goals, that were initially externally motivated 
as part of their autonomous behavior so that the external contingency is no longer needed 
to invoke the performance. Self-determination theory (Gagné and Deci 2005) postulates 
that the more an individual feels controlled, the less likely they are to internalize external 
regulations, values, and rules. This theory could account for monitoring intensity being 
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positively related to volunteer rates on “optional” tasks, yet negatively related to 
performance on the “optional” tasks.  
 This paper adds to the prior literature by showing evidence that employee 
monitoring, as an organizational control mechanism, has negative effects on internal 
motivation as compared to trust and reciprocity. However, the effects of lower internal 
motivation are not readily visible on the monitored aspects of tasks, but are more likely to 
manifest around the less monitored aspects of the task or the parts of the task which are 
perceived by the agent as being optional. These findings suggest that when the principal-
agent relationship involves a complex job design, it may be more beneficial for the 
principal to rely on trust and reciprocity instead of control, especially if the principal can 
only monitor, or measure, part of the agent’s overall job or output.  
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides more theory 
and background, Section III develops the hypotheses, Section IV describes the research 
design, Section V provides the analysis of the results, and Section VI discusses 
extensions, limitations, implications, and conclusions of the study.  
THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
Monitoring and Agency theory 
 In accounting and finance-related research, agency theory dominates the 
discussion of organization control and management. Lambert (2001, 3) states that 
“agency theory has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms in accounting 
during the last 20 years. The primary feature of agency theory that has made it attractive 
to accounting researchers is that it allows us to explicitly incorporate conflicts of interest, 
incentive problems, and mechanisms for controlling incentive problems into our models.” 
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In the standard agency theory model, income earned provides benefits while the effort 
spent to earn it is a disutility. Further, agents will always exploit opportunities to lower 
their effort absent a penalty for doing so. The introduction of more monitoring cannot 
lower effort since agents are naturally effort averse (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) and are, 
presumably, already maximizing income and minimizing effort, on average, at any given 
point in time. 
 Despite its successes, agency theory has been criticized for the diminished realism 
of adhering strictly to narrow self-interest and ignoring nonmonetary preferences such as 
ethics, trust, and fairness (Arrow 1985). Many modern corporate contracts, control 
systems, and governance structures are designed and based on the principles of agency 
theory. This reality essentially means that many of the corporate “best practices” 
accepted today do not emphasize important psychological components. Arce (2007) 
examined how the assumptions of agency theory may be self-activating. He did so by 
exploring a principal-agent framework that allows for the possibility that rational agents 
may hold intrinsic preferences for autonomy in decision making and experience disutility 
from being monitored. His analysis identified conditions under which the economic 
approach to agency, which is principally framed in terms of monetary rewards and the 
avoidance of effort, can select against agents' intrinsic preferences for autonomy and 
break implicit contracts between principal and agent that are based on trust. In short, if 
controls are built purely on economic rationality, then that is the type of behavior they 
will cultivate. For example, agency-theory-based contracts have been accused of 
encouraging opportunistic behavior (Ferraro et al. 2005) and blamed for the deteriorating 
moral climate that has given rise to Enron and other corporate scandals (Kulik 2005). 
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 This experiment builds upon a long and interesting line of research that attempts 
to add a human psychological component to the standard agency theory assumptions. I 
test the standard agency theory assumption that monitoring cannot decrease effort, by 
examining how monitoring affects performance on the aspects of tasks that the agent may 
consider discretionary or voluntary. The goal of this line of research is to add descriptive, 
prescriptive, and pedagogical usefulness to the principal-agent model (Stevens and 
Thevaranjan 2010). 
Monitoring and Effort 
 In a widely cited discussion article, Frey (1993) asked the rhetorical question 
“does monitoring always increase effort?”  rey’s main concern was the triangular 
connection of monitoring, trust, and effort in the principal-agent relationship. He 
concluded that the effects of monitoring on effort depend on whether the agent perceives 
the monitoring to be a signal of distrust, which is more likely to be the case when the 
agent and principal have an inter-personal relationship. When a psychological contract 
exists between the agent and principal, an increase in, or focus on, monitoring may be 
seen as violation of the mutual trust that has been established in the relationship. With 
their previous psychological bond broken, the agent now has a lower marginal benefit 
from working and higher marginal benefit from shirking. Shirking is now more likely, 
assuming that the agent has the opportunity. 
 Dickinson and Villeval (2  8) tested  rey’s (1993) theory in a laboratory setting. 
They were interested in how anonymous versus interpersonal auditing would affect 
effort. Their treatments were applied by having a portion of the participants meet with the 
individual serving as their monitor and sit by their monitor during the experiment, while 
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the other participants never met or saw their monitor. The task involved using a computer 
to move electronically along a line for a performance contingent wage. Each move cost 
the operator monetarily (a proxy for effort), and, the monitor’s payoff depended on the 
operator’s performance. If the operator was audited and underperformed, a fine was 
incurred by the operator and retained by the monitor. They find that most agents react to 
high levels of monitoring by increasing performance. However, they find that above a 
certain threshold, monitoring decreases effort, and this effect is most pronounced in the 
interpersonal treatment. The current research design differs from Dickinson and Villeval 
(2008) because I set out to capture changes in discretionary effort and volunteer rates for 
optional tasks, and I am using actual work effort instead of a proxy. 
 In another interesting study, Callahan and Larson (1990) tested whether 
performance monitoring can influence work behavior in the absence of any subsequent 
managerial action or feedback. They postulated that monitoring activity alone can serve 
as cue, signaling the relative importance of one task over another. In their experiment, 
they gave each participant two tasks, which they were to work on concurrently for two 
hours. In the control group, the participants were left alone for two hours. In the treatment 
group, the experimenter would come in every 20 minutes and check the progress of one 
of the tasks only, offering no feedback. Despite being instructed to work diligently on 
both tasks, the treated participants outperformed on the monitored task while 
performance on the non-monitored task fell in proportion. The net effect of monitoring, 
when total production on both tasks was considered, was small as compared to a control 
group who worked on both tasks without any monitoring.  
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 Falk and Kosfeld (2006) looked at the effects of control on effort. They found that 
control entails a hidden cost as most participants (agents) reduced their effort, which was 
chosen at a cost to the agent, in response to hurdles set by the principal. When asked for 
their emotional perception of control, most agents who reacted negatively said that they 
perceived the controlling decision, to set a hurdle, as a signal of distrust and a limitation 
of their autonomy. Falk and Kosfield (2006) suggest that agents do not like being 
restricted. They also suggest that agents perceive controls as a signal of distrust and low 
expectations.  
 Employee reactions to monitoring and control matter because organizations have 
a strong stake in maintaining both employee motivation and well-being. Most researchers 
suggest that monitoring technology itself is neutral, and that it is the design and 
implementation of the technology that affects employee reactions (Alder and Ambrose 
2005). For instance, Stanton and Weiss (2000) claim that when employers provide 
adequate justification for monitoring there are generally few negative effects. However, 
most of this evidence comes from employee surveys and interviews, as there is very little 
empirical evidence on the matter. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 The negative effects of rewards, incentives, and punishment on internal 
motivation have been well documented by researchers (Gneezy et al. 2011; Deci et al. 
1999). Behavioral theorists predict that the same phenomenon, known as “crowding out,” 
will also be a factor in the relationship of monitoring and internal motivation (Frey 1994). 
Because monitoring has a direct effect on task effort through the control system, studying 
the links between monitoring, intrinsic motivation, and effort is difficult. In the past, 
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researchers have overcome this problem by using intrinsically motivating tasks, such as 
puzzle solving. Researchers have manipulated the control system, and then measured 
how well the participants performed on the task, their attitude toward the task, or the time 
they spent working on the task during free-time (Wiersma 2011). However, the value of 
this research, and its theories, is limited for managerial research because most work-
related tasks are not purely intrinsically motivating, yet people still perform work-related 
tasks with varying levels of performance under various levels of controls and monitoring. 
For this reason, Self-determination theory (Gagné and Deci 2005) serves as more 
practical way of viewing motivation for work-related tasks. 
 Self-determination theory posits that motivation represents a continuum from no 
motivation (amotivation) to completely internal motivation, with different levels of 
external motivation in the middle. The levels of external motivation range from being 
completely controlled and performing a task, to being completely autonomous and 
performing a task. One major point is that when one autonomously performs a task, it 
does not necessarily mean that the task is intrinsically motivating. Self-determination 
theory suggests that intrinsic motivation concerns experiencing activities as being 
interesting and spontaneously satisfying, whereas autonomous extrinsic motivation 
concerns experiencing activities, not as interesting or fun, but as personally important for 
one’s self-selected aims, goals, and purposes (Gagné and Deci 2005). Autonomous 
extrinsic motivation results from the internalization of an extrinsically motivated 
behavior into a personally endorsed behavior. The importance of this theory, especially to 
managerial research, is that it shows how monitoring and control can affect motivation on 
tasks that are not inherently intrinsically motivating. According to the Self-determination 
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theory, the monitoring and control of an agent should increase external motivation and 
decrease the internalization of any goals or values associated with the task or job. 
Conversely, trust and autonomy should increase internal motivation and increase the 
internalization of task goals. In my hypothesis, I attempt to test these propositions. 
Mandatory Task Quantity and Quality 
 When the agent is performing a simple mandatory task, monitoring may be a 
substitute for internal motivation. Consistent with traditional agency theory, since most 
individuals are not intrinsically motivated to perform common work tasks, monitoring 
should increase effort spent by the agent. However, the increase effort may be focused 
only on the monitored aspects of the task since the agent has less internal motivation to 
focus on other aspects of the task.  
 If monitoring increases external motivation and lowers internal motivation, then it 
should negatively affect discretionary effort, as shown in Figure 2.1. In this experiment, 
monitoring of the agent is such that quality is less observable, more difficult to measure, 
and left more to the discretion of the worker, than quantity. In the event of a loss of 
intrinsic motivation that may result from monitoring, quality is likely to suffer before 
quantity.
1
 This leads to the following substantive hypotheses about quantity and quality: 
H1a: All else equal, production quantity increases as the intensity of monitoring 
increases. 
 
H1b: All else equal, production quality decreases as the intensity of monitoring 
increases.  
 
                                                        
 
1 Hypothesis 1b may fail to be supported if monitoring drives quantity, and there is a high level of 
performance spillover (Hecht et al. 2012), where an increased attention to one task measure (quantity) 




Figure 2.1.Thoeretical Model: The link between external motivation and discretionary or 




Optional Task Volunteer Rates and Effort  
 Some researchers have suggested that performance and effort, on all but the 
simplest job design, can be categorized into two parts, task performance and contextual 
performance (see Motowildo and Van Scotter 1994). Borman and Motowidlo (1993) 
defined task performance as activities that are formally recognized as part of the job and 
that contribute to the organization’s technical core, while they defined contextual 
performance as individual behavior that is discretionary and that in the aggregate 
promotes the effective functioning of the organization. For example, when an individual 
performs extra work tasks voluntarily, or provides thoughtful ideas and feedback to 




performance. While it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of “internal motivation 
versus control” on the various aspects of mandatory task performance, it should not be as 
difficult to disentangle the effects of “internal motivation versus control” on contextual 
performance because contextual performance often falls outside of the control system, 
and should be driven, mostly, by internal motivation. If monitoring decreases intrinsic 
motivation, contextual performance should decrease as well. From this logic I draw my 
last two hypotheses. 
H2a:  All else equal, increased task-monitoring intensity decreases volunteer 
rates on optional tasks. 
 
H2b:  All else equal, increased task-monitoring intensity decreases the effort 
spent on optional tasks. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This experiment was carried out in a computer lab at large public university. 
Twelve sessions were held and each session included either 9 or 10 participants. A 
diverse group of 114 adult volunteers participated. Participants were recruited through the 
university email newsletter, flyers, and word of mouth. Participants self-registered online 
and chose the session date and time they preferred. Upon arrival, the participants were 
given a short demographic survey, as shown in Appendix A. Question 6 was a distractor 
to help disguise the purpose of the study, and 7 through 9 were exploratory, potential 

















Male 19 17 18 54 47%
Female 19 21 20 60 53%
114 100%
Age
18-24 23 26 18 67 59%
Over 24 15 12 20 47 41%
114 100%
Student Nationality
Domestic 23 24 21 68 60%
International 14 10 12 36 32%
Not a Student 1 4 5 10 9%
114 100%
Business Student
Business Student 14 11 11 36 32%
Non-Business Student 23 23 21 67 59%
Not a Student 1 4 6 11 10%
114 100%
College Level
Fresh/Soph 19 18 8 45 39%
Junior/Senior 13 8 12 33 29%
Graduate 5 8 10 23 20%
Non Student 1 4 8 13 11%








 The sessions were pre-assigned one of three monitoring treatments: electronic 
monitoring as the most intense treatment,
2
 human monitoring as a mid-level treatment, 
and trust (no monitoring) as a low-level treatment. When the participants arrived they 
were provided a consent form and demographic survey. Next, their attention was directed 
to the white board where the task schedule and compensation plan were explained. All 
the participants were told that they were being paid a $10 flat wage to complete 27-
minute task. They were told that the flat wage meant that it did not matter how much 
work they performed but they must work the entire time. The participants were told that 
they would have a short free time break after the task before moving on to different tasks. 
The short break allowed for the chance to offer optional work, as explained below. 
 Individuals in the electronic monitoring treatment had one small webcam facing 
their workstation keyboard and papers when they arrived, as shown in Appendix B. The 
goal of the webcam placement was to create the perception that the focus of the 
monitoring was on quantity of work. This monitoring design is tantamount to input 
monitoring (see Pendergrast 2   ) where the agent’s inputs, such as work time, progress, 
and resources are closely watched, but the output is unknown or unmonitored. The 
purpose of this monitoring design was to create a task control system where work quality 
was more discretionary than work quantity. Participants in the electronically monitored 
group received all the same task instructions as the other two groups, except they were 
told that “you are being monitored with webcams so we can observe your work and make 
                                                        
 2 While electronic monitoring and traditional human monitoring have the same fundamental 
purpose, past research suggest that the pervasive, continuous nature of electronic monitoring often elicits 
stronger reactions from the worker (Aiello and Kolb 1995; Lund 1992; Stanton 2000).   
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sure you follow the instructions as given.”
3
 Unbeknownst to the participants, the 
webcams were not activated. However, the experimenter and research assistant sat 
prominently at a corner workstation that the subjects believed to be the “monitoring 
station.” The setup was designed so that when the monitoring station was manned the 
subjects believed they were being monitored and when the station was unmanned the 
subjects believed they were not being monitored. The station was manned for the entire 
task period but not during the free time break when the optional task was offered. 
 Participants in the human monitored group were subjected to traditional human 
monitoring and received all the same task instructions as the other two groups, except 
they were told that “I will walk around the room so I can observe your work and make 
sure you follow the instructions as given.” The researcher and the research assistant 
wandered around the room and passively observed the participants during the task time 
but left the room during the free time break when the optional task was offered. . 
 Individuals in the trust treatment received all the same task instructions as the 
other groups. However, they were told that “you will not be watched and we believe you 
will follow instructions as given.” In this treatment, all research personnel then left the 
room and returned when time was up
4
 and then left again during the free time break when 
the optional task was offered. 
 All the participants performed a data correction task, based on the experimental 
design used in Stanton and Sarkar-Barney (2003). The computer at the participant’s 
                                                        
 
3
 This wording used in the participant instructions is based on the wording used in the study by 
Enzle and Anderson (1993). Their study looked at the effects of controlling versus non-controlling 
electronic monitoring on intrinsic motivation. 
   
  
4
 Rousseau et al. (1998, 395) defined trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” 
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workstation had a spreadsheet opened up. Each row on the spreadsheet represented a 
different invoice, and each column contained a data point such as invoice number, 
invoice date, customer name, customer address, items bought, total due, etc. There were a 
total of 24 data points for every one of the 50 invoices provided. Each participant was 
told to crosscheck the electronic database records against hardcopies of the invoices, 
which were bound in a folder at the workstation. The participants were told they were 
checking behind an individual who entered the data very quickly and that they each had 
different invoices except for the first sample invoice; all actually received the same data. 
The sample invoice was worked with them, on a projector, by the researcher as an 
example. Each invoice had between one and five errors, randomly distributed, with an 
average of three errors per record. Appendix C shows an actual invoice used, and 
Appendix D shows part of the spreadsheet used in the experiment.    
 After the participants completed the 27-minute task, they were told that they were 
to take a short “free time” break where they could rest, check their cell phone, or open up 
the Internet browser.
5
 They were asked not to speak to anyone in person or on the phone. 
Immediately after being informed of the free time options, they were told the following: 
“Also, let me direct your attention to the back of the invoice folder. There you will find 
three feedback forms. The feedback you provide helps us to improve the task you 
performed. The feedback forms are optional and not required.” All research personnel 
then left the room for the remainder of the break. The participants had approximately 5 
minutes of break time. The three feedback forms requested responses on a Likert Scale 
                                                        
  5 This was the first of three experiments for which the participants had volunteered that day, 
providing the context for this “break” time. The participants were told in the consent form that they 
should not leave the room until the session is completely over. 
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had eight questions per form, and could be filled out in less than 1 minute per form, as 
shown is Appendix E. 
 Two measures were taken from the analysis of this optional task: whether the 
participant volunteered (binary), and if so, the effort expended. If the participant filled out 
any forms (volunteered) then effort expended was measured by the participant’s outcome 
on the optional task. If the participant only partially completed the voluntary optional task 
by filling out 1 or 2 feedback forms than effort expended was lower than if the participant 
completed the task by filling out all 3 feedback forms.  
RESULTS 
Mandatory Task Quantity 
 Consistent with traditional agency theory, Hypothesis 1a predicts that, all else 
equal, production quantity would increase as the intensity of monitoring increased. The 
mean number of invoices checked was 17.16 for the trust treatment, 17.29 for the human 
monitored treatment, and 16.68 for the electronically monitored group, as shown in Panel 
A of Table 2.2. An ANOVA (Panel B of Table 2.2) shows no significant difference (p= 
.83) between treatment groups in the quantity of work performed on the assigned task. 
Including covariates to the analysis did not change this result. The power of the ANOVA 
is approximately .60, assuming a medium effect size and alpha risk set at .10. Therefore, 





Summary Statistics and ANOVA for Work Quantity by Monitoring Treatment 
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Treatment Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Trust 38 17.16 4.67 10 26
Human Monitoring 38 17.29 4.63 6 29
Electronic Monitoring 38 16.68 4.54 8 28
Total 114 17.04 4.58 6 29
Panel B: ANOVA Results
Number of Observations 114 R- squared 0.00
Root MSE 4.61 Adj R-squared -0.01
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 7.70 2 3.85 0.18 0.83
Treatment 7.70 2 3.85 0.18 0.83
Residual 2361.08 111 21.27
Total 2368.78 113 20.96
Note: Work Quantity is measured as the number of records checked during the task time, regardless 
of quality. Individuals checked a box for each record they reviewed. This was cross-checked against  















Production Task Quality 
 Hypothesis 1b predicts that, all else equal, production quality will decrease as the 
intensity of monitoring increased. When monitoring was applied, the quality of the work 
was more discretionary than the quantity of work. For this reason, quality is considered 
discretionary effort. Quality was operationalized at the number of errors corrected 
divided by the number of errors in the invoices checked. The seeded errors ranged from 
one to five per document, and averaged around three errors per record regardless of the 
number of records that the participant completed. 
  The mean quality was .864 for the trust treatment, .816 for the human monitored 
treatment, and .820 for the electronically monitored group, as shown in Panel A of Table 
2.3. The ANOVA in Panel B of Table 2.3 shows a difference in the quality of work 
performed on the task between treatment groups (p= .069). Including covariates to the 
analysis did not change this result. In a planned comparison between the Trust group and 
the two monitored groups, the Trust group shows a significantly higher rate of 












Summary Statistics and ANOVA for Work Quality by Monitoring Treatment 
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Treatment Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Trust 38 0.864 0.083 0.578 0.970
Human Monitoring 38 0.816 0.109 0.455 0.952
Electronic Monitoring 38 0.820 0.107 0.474 0.978
Total 114 0.833 0.102 0.455 0.978
Panel B: ANOVA Results
Number of Observations 114 R- squared 0.05
Root MSE 0.100 Adj R-squared 0.03
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 0.055 2 0.028 2.74 0.069
Treatment 0.055 2 0.028 2.74 0.069
Residual 1.121 111 0.010
Total 1.176 113 0.100
Panel C: Planned Comparison
Contrast Std Error df Sig. 2-tailed
Assuming Equal Variance 1 0.047 0.020 111 0.02
Not Assuming Equal Variance 1 0.047 0.018 93 0.01
Note: Work quality is measured as the number of errors corrected divided by the number of errors
encountered during the task time, regardless of quantity. Errors were randomly distributed and















Volunteer Rates for Optional Task 
 Hypothesis 2a predicts that, all else equal, task-monitoring intensity will be 
negatively related to volunteer rates on optional tasks. Volunteer rates for optional tasks 
were measured by the willingness of the participants to offer any optional feedback 
during their free time break.  
 The proportions of volunteers were .737 for the trust treatment, .763 for the 
human monitored treatment, and .921 for the electronically monitored group, as shown in 
Panel A of Table 2.4. The results show, through a logistic regression, a significant 
difference in the volunteer rates for optional tasks across treatment groups. The 
electronically monitored group showed a higher propensity to volunteer (p= .04), as 
shown in Panel B of Table 2.4. The Chi-square analysis confirms a difference in the 
number of volunteers across treatment groups (p= .09). 
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Table 2.4  
Optional Task Volunteer Rates by Monitoring Treatment: Summary Statistics, Logistic 
Regression, and Chi-Square Test 
 
Treatment Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Trust 38 0.737 0.446 0 1
Human Monitoring 38 0.763 0.431 0 1
Electronic Monitoring 38 0.921 0.273 0 1
Total 114 0.807 0.396 0 1
Observations 114
Log likelhihood -53.20 LR chi2 (2) 5.440
Pseudo R2 0.05 Prob > chi2 0.066
Volunteered Coef. Std. Error Z P>|z|
Electronic Monitoring 1.43 0.71 2.02 0.04
Human Monitored 0.14 0.53 0.26 0.79
Constant 1.03 0.37 2.79 0.01
Panel C: Chi-Square Test and Fisher's Exact
Treatment No Yes Total
Trust 10 28 38
Human Monitored 9 29 38
Electronic Monitored 3 35 38
Total 22 92 114
Fisher's Exact Test
Pearson chi (4) = 4.8 Fisher's Exact = 0.09
Pr = 0.09
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Volunteered
Note: The paticipants had the opportunity to volunteer to provide feedback during a short free time
Panel B: Logistic Regression
Pearson's Chi-Squared Test
break after their task. Volunteers were coded as 1 if the particpant volunteered to provide any
optional feedback about the clerical task they performed for a flat wage, and 0 otherwise.
 
 






 These results are contrary to Hypothesis 2a, which states that monitoring intensity 
will decrease volunteer rates for optional tasks. Conversely, I find evidence that the 
relationship may be positive. The analysis of Hypothesis 2b, concerning the effort 
expended, however, provides a more complete picture. 
Effort Spent on Optional Tasks  
 Hypothesis 2b predicted that, all else equal, task-monitoring intensity would be 
negatively related to the effort spent on optional tasks by volunteers. In this experiment, 
the effort spent on optional tasks is measured by the participant’s output on the optional 
task. If the participant only partially completed the voluntary optional task by filling out 
one or two feedback forms than effort expended was lower than if the participant 
completed the task by filling out all three forms. The results from the volunteer rate 
analysis, above, show that as monitoring increased more individuals volunteered for the 
optional task. Table 2.5 reveals, however, that as monitoring increases more people 













Frequency Analysis of Optional Task Outcomes 
Treatment Abstained Partial Complete Total
Trust 10 9 19 38
Human Monitor 9 14 15 38
Electronic Monitor 3 19 16 38
Total 22 42 50 114
Fisher's Exact Test





Note: This table examines the effects of monitoring intensity on the outcomes of an optional task, 
filling out feedback forms about a mandatory task. Particiants either abstained, started but 




 Once the decision was made to give feedback, the trust group spent the most 
effort on feedback. On average, the trust group filled out 2.43 feedback forms, the human 
monitored group filled out 2.14 feedback forms, and the electronically monitored group 
filled out 2.11 feedback forms (summary not shown). Since my measure of effort was the 
participant’s outcome on the optional task, it is appropriate to use Pearson’s Chi-square 
Test and  isher’s Exact Test, as shown in Table 2.5. The results show a significant 
statistical difference across groups between the number of individuals who abstain, give 
partial feedback, and give full feedback, at the . 9 confidence level for the Pearson’s Chi-
square Test and . 8 for the  isher’s Exact Test. The ratio of those of who start but fail to 
complete the optional task to those who start and finish the task is .47 to 1 for the trust 
group, .93 to 1 for the human monitored group, and 1.19 to 1 for the electronic 
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monitoring treatment. Overall the results support Hypothesis 2b, that all else equal, task-
monitoring intensity is negatively related to the effort spent on optional tasks. Including 
covariates in the analysis did not change this result.  
CONCLUSION 
 This study finds evidence that traditional agency theory models are wrong when 
they assume that monitoring cannot reduce worker effort. Further, this paper seems to 
indicate that there does not have to be a psychological bond broken between the agent 
and the principal for monitoring to have an effect on effort. Evidence is shown to support 
the idea that there are significant “hidden costs monitoring” which are often elusive to 
managers and researchers. The effects of monitoring often go unnoticed because they 
aggregate outside of the monitoring system, where lower internal motivation can be 
expressed with fewer repercussions for the agent.  
 These findings may also help to suggest, or explain, certain aspects of job design 
and performance such as those laid out by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991) suggest that an employer, when faced with multiple employees and 
multiple jobs, should group jobs that can be easily measured together and assign those 
jobs to one group of employees, while assigning the other group of employees jobs that 
cannot be easily measured. This paper supports this recommendation, especially if the 
measurement process involves input monitoring. 
 It is reasonable to assume from the evidence shown in this paper that monitored 
individuals may work at a slightly lower effort levels than trusted individuals on 
mandatory work tasks. In this experiment, there were no difference in work quantity, but 
the trust monitored group had higher work quality. These finding support the conclusion 
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of past studies that show the movement toward more flexible workplaces (Shepard et al. 
1996) and telecommuting increase overall output (Westfall 2004).  
 In this study, as monitoring increased so did volunteer rates, even though the 
monitor left the room during the time the optional task was performed. There are at least 
three reasons why this outcome may have occurred. First, it is possible that the monitored 
individuals assumed they were still being monitored even when the monitor had left the 
room. Second, the control of the monitoring may have carried over psychologically for a 
short time. Third, the controlled individuals may have cherished the return of their 
freedom. It is unknown if one these possibilities, or a combination, led to the higher 
volunteer rates. However, one thing is clear, as volunteer rates for the optional task 
increased, the average effort spent on the optional task, by those who volunteered, 
decreased. This decrease in effort is indicative of lower internal motivation. 
 Future research should focus more on learning how internal controls affect the 
performance of optional work tasks and discretionary parts of mandatory tasks. With the 
increasing complexity of the work environment and the increasing demand for customer 
service, optional and discretionary effort is increasingly important. Another interesting 
avenue of research is the interaction of pay schemes and monitoring intensity on optional 
and discretionary effort. 
 This research design in this study has several limitations that also offer avenues 
for future research. A very short time dimension is considered in this experiment. It is 
likely that over time individuals will change their behavior with respect to monitoring; 
however some research suggest that the change could be decreased tolerance rather than 
acclimation to intense monitoring (Smith et al. 1992). Although this research design has 
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limitations, it has the opportunity to open up new lanes of research on the topics of 






THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING ENVIRONMENT ON  




 In a successful organization, employees and managers should be creative and 
mentally flexible. This is especially true in the public accounting profession, where 
change is constant and the demand for services is high. Bonner and Lewis (1990) 
described “problem solving adaptability,” in the auditing context, as the ability to 
recognize relationships, interpret data, and reason analytically. Similarly, Baril et al. 
(1998) claim that the ability to recognize that there are a variety of solutions to a 
particular problem is important to success in the accounting profession.
3
 While 
researchers have tended to focus on individual characteristics correlated with problem 
solving (Gibbins and Jamal 1993), Libby and Luft (1993) warn that research which fails 
to consider the environment will miss important determinants of performance, since 
environmental factors affect motivation, knowledge, and ability. One increasingly 
important, but often overlooked, environmental variable is worker autonomy.   
 Some researchers have suggested that strict environmental controls can have 
detrimental effects on creative thinking (Hennesey and Amabile 1998; Elsbach and 
Hargadon 2006), which is critical for finding the optimal solution to complex problems.
4
 
Individuals are likely to be most creative when they experience high levels of intrinsic 
motivation (Amabile 1996), since such motivation increases their tendency to be curious, 
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 Many researchers have suggested that the ability to recognize and/or check for multiple solutions 




 Luchins (1942, 37) was one of the first researchers to suggest that authoritarian control may 




cognitively flexible, risk taking, and persistent in the face of barriers (Utman 1997; Zhou 
and  Shalley 2003). Similarly, the theory of social facilitation states that individuals have 
various social, physiological, behavioral, and cognitive reactions to being monitored, 
watched, or judged (Zajonc 1965; Aiello and Douthitt 2001), which undermine 
performance on complex tasks, but positively affect performance on simple tasks. The 
purpose of the current research is to extend the managerial literature by investigating the 
effects of the monitoring environment on key aspects of individuals’ problem solving 
ability.     
In this research design, I use an adaptation of Luchins’s (19 2) water-jar task
5
 to 
examine pattern establishment, problem solving rigidity (pattern breaking), and problem 
solving creativity, under three different types of worker monitoring. One hundred 
fourteen participants were assigned to one of three monitoring treatments, trust (no 
monitoring), human monitoring, and electronic monitoring. Once the treatment was 
induced, the participants were given the water-jar problems to test the three different 
aspects of their problem solving ability. Using computer illustration, the water-jar task 
gives the participant three water jars (Jar A, Jar B, and Jar C) of different sizes and asks 
them to fill one of those jars to a specific volume, a volume not directly available by 
filling only one of the jars (Appendix F shows the water-jar task user interface and the 
bottom of Appendix G shows the participant’s answer form). Participants are then 
instructed to use the simplest method possible to solve each problem. They are allowed 
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 Fessler (2003) is one of the few research experiments in the recent managerial accounting 
literature to use the water-jar tasks. His research focused on task attractiveness, compensation scheme, and 
performance. In earlier accounting research, Stedry (1960) used the water-jar task to look at goal difficulty 




two minutes to solve each problem by writing their answer on the answer form, but can 
move on to the next problem if finished before the time limit.  
 The first several problems (Problems 1- 6) all have the B-A-C-C solution as the 
correct answer. These problems test the participant’s ability to establish and rely on a 
pattern. The next three problems (Problems 7-9) offer a simpler solution (either A-C or 
A+C) as well as the B-A-C-C solution. These dual answer problems are known as 
“critical problems.”
6
 Normally, most individuals who have found and used the pattern 
will become blind to the simpler solutions available to solve the critical problems, and 
will continue to use the pattern answer. Luchins (1942) labeled the solution blindness 
“Einstellung” effect.
7
 These problems (Problems 7-9) test the participant’s susceptibility 
to Einstellung blindness. The final three problems (Problems 10-12) all have different 
solutions, which increase in complexity, and test the participant’s ability to solve 
complex problems. Appendix G shows a summary of the problem types the participants 
face as they progress through the water-jar task, and the answer sheet provided.  
 Based on past literature, I hypothesize that participants in the monitored 
treatments will 1) have more difficulty finding and using the pattern, 2) more often fail to 
recognize when the pattern is no longer efficient (Einstellung blindness), and, 3) solve 
fewer complex problems than individuals in the trust treatment. I find evidence to support 
the first two hypotheses related to pattern establishment and pattern breaking, and less 
clear, but interesting, evidence concerning the third hypothesis related to complex 
problem solving. With respect to complex problem solving, an interesting interaction 
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 For examples and more explanations of the terminology associated with the water-jar task, see 








between an individual’s self-reported base ability and the monitoring environment was 
found. Individuals who reported being good in the related ability underperformed on 
complex problem solving in a trusting environment and outperformed in the human and 
electronic monitored environments.  
THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
 Problem solving rigidity and Einstellung blindness are not just laboratory 
phenomena but are common cognitive biases.
8
 Research suggests that even people who 
are professionals in their domain can miss simple solutions to “critical problems.”
9
 For 
example, Bilalić et al. (2008) showed that master chess players can become fixated to 
complex chess strategies after performing the same moves several times, and miss 
simpler effective moves. Similarly, evolutionary scientist Stephen Jay Gould (1996) 
discussed, in his controversial book The Mismeasure of Man, how scientists can be so 
strongly influenced by a theory they already hold, and have experience with, that they do 
not interpret new data objectively. In an accounting domain example, Marchant et al. 
(1991) found that expert tax preparers were slower to adapt to new tax laws because they 
failed to consider new relevant information.  
 Problem solving and creativity have been examined in conjunction with a variety 
of environmental and personal factors. In examples of environmental factors, researchers 
have shown that individuals can become rigid in their problem solving abilities when in 
stressful situations (Schultz and Searleman 1998; Cowen 1952) or faced with aggression 
(Carnevale and Probst 1998). Conversely, individuals who receive positive affect (Isen et 
                                                        
 
8
 Cognitive Bias is defined as a pattern of deviation in judgment that occurs in particular 
situations, which may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, 








al. 1987) or who work on complex tasks with autonomy have been found to develop more 
creative ideas (Hatcher et al. 1999; Tierney and Farmer 2004). In examples of personality 
factors, researchers have shown that the “five factor” personality dimension of 
“openness” is associated with creativity (Fiest 1998) while Erikson (2012) found that 




 Financial and managerial accounting researchers have been interested in 
“fixation” for some time. A popular line of research is concerned with why some 
individuals appropriately update their decisions in response to changes in accounting 
methods and some individuals do not (Wilner and Birnberg 1986). The failure to adapt 
decisions to a change in accounting method is referred to as accounting fixation. 
Accounting fixation is indicated by the inability of users of accounting information to 
look behind the labels attached to accounting numbers (such as "cost" or "income") to 
adjust for changes that have occurred in the accounting techniques or methods used to 
determine that number (Bloom et al. 1984). Dearman and Shields (2005) argue that the 
ability to adapt one's decision process to a change in accounting method will be a 
function of one's task-relevant knowledge, problem solving ability, and intrinsic 
motivation. However, Wiley (1998) suggests that experts may be more prone to fixation 
because their domain-specific knowledge hinders their search for new information.  
 Given the role of auditors and public accountants in dealing with fraud and 
misreporting, understanding cognitive biases that hinder hypothesis generation and 
problem solving adaptability is critical. For instance, Bierstaker and Wright (2001) 
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 See Shalley et al. (2004) for review of contextual factors, personal factors, and interactions that 




showed that practical problem solving ability was significantly correlated with 
performance on internal control evaluation tasks. Bonner and Lewis (1990) assert that 
problem solving ability, which they describe as the ability to recognize relationships, 
interpret data, and reason analytically, is one of the main determinants of auditor 
expertise. Further, SAS 56 calls for auditors to identify unexpected patterns in financial 
data and to hypothesize about the likely cause. However, auditors may become fixated on 
past patterns, and hypotheses, causing them to fail to incorporate all the new information 
they have at their disposal (Mock and Wright 1993; Wright and Bedard 2000). The 
failure to incorporate new data may lead to lower quality audits and, ultimately, more 
financial misstatements and financial fraud.   
 Problem solving rigidity works against the auditor’s ability to solve unique 
problems and to reason analytically. In related examples, Mock and Wright (1993), 
looking at 74 random audits, found a weak relationship between client risks and audit 
programs. They also found that audit programs changed little over time with many tests 
done across a broad array of engagements. This is troubling since auditors are supposed 
to avoid becoming predictable, lest management and employees easily avoid the auditor’s 
tests.  
 Asare and Wright (2003), in a laboratory experiment, examine the linkage among 
the initial hypothesis set, the information search, and decision performance in analytical 
procedures. They find that auditors who inherit, or generate, an incorrect hypothesis set, 
but still receive balanced evidence, do not perform well because they are unwilling or 
unable to generate additional hypotheses during the investigation phase, and they have 




Asare and Wright (2003) acknowledge that auditors become fixated on certain 
hypotheses, they do not address the causes of fixation. Research into the environmental 
and personal factors which cause auditors or managers to become fixated on hypotheses 
and solutions may be important to the advancement of techniques and practices. 
  In this research, I investigate the effects of monitoring environment on different 
aspects of problem solving ability and problem solving fixation. If monitoring affects 
problem solving, the effects are likely attributable to social facilitation. The theory of 
social facilitation states that individuals have various social, physiological, behavioral, 
and cognitive reactions to being monitored, watched, or judged (Zajonc 1965; Aiello and 
Douthitt 2001). One common finding in the social facilitation literature is that monitoring 
negatively affects performance on complex tasks, and positively affects performance on 
simple tasks.
11
 Since problem solving tasks are inherently complex,
12
 there should be a 
negative relationship between monitoring intensity and most aspects of problem solving 
capabilities. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 The water-jar task can be broken down into three parts: the first involves pattern 
recognition and use, the second Einstellung blindness, and the third complex problem 
solving ability. Accordingly, I test for the effect of the monitoring environment on each 
part of the task, as shown in Appendix G. In the first part, the participant will establish a 
pattern, known in the problem solving literature as a mental set. When a mental set is 
established, the participant will tend to stop looking for new solutions and rely on the 
known pattern. Research suggests that high stress and low intrinsic motivation may 
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activate individuals’ need for closure, increasing the use of heuristics (Kruglanski and 
Fruend 1983) and leading individuals to lessen their search for new information (Klein 
and Webster 2000). Establishing a mental set usually leads to an increase in structure and 
a decrease in uncertainty (Shultz and Searleman 1997). If one is not enjoying the problem 
solving process, they will likely engage in the problem solving mental process for a 
shorter period of time, and will likely not stay open to the possibility of new solutions. 
With simple tasks, higher levels of monitoring should increase pattern recognition, 
pattern reliance, and the use of shortcuts.  
 However, the water-jar task is complex,
13
 and as such, may be negatively affected 
by monitoring. In the presence of other people, by the phenomena known as social 
facilitation,
14
 people tend to improve performance on simple tasks but their performance 
is impaired on complex tasks (Zajonc 1965, 1980). Aiello and Shao (1993) extended the 
social facilitation theory to include electronic monitoring by showing that when a task is 
the least bit complex (i.e., requires some thought) electronic monitoring lowers 
performance. In the water-jar task, being able to recognize and use the pattern solution 
requires complex thought. It is likely that individuals who are monitored at higher levels 
will not recognize and use the pattern efficiently, causing them to miss the pattern 
solution problems more often than individuals who are not monitored. Therefore I make 
the following substantive hypothesis:    
H1:  Individuals who are monitored at a higher level will fail to recognize and 
use a pattern more often than those who are not monitored at a higher 
level.   
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 In the second part of the water-jar task, after working six problems where the 
pattern solution was the best answer, the participant will be tested for Einstellung 
blindness with the next three problems. These problems offer the pattern solution from 
the earlier problems, but offer a simpler solution as well. The simpler solution is actually 
the correct solution, as the instructions are to give the simplest solution possible as their 
answer. As noted above, researchers have found that time constraints and stress lead to an 
increase in Einstellung blindness (Luchins 1942; Schultz and Searleman 1998). Thus, 
individuals who feel monitored or controlled will suffer from Einstellung blindness at a 
higher rate than those who do not feel monitored. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2:  Individuals who are monitored at a higher level will have Einstellung 
blindness more than those who are not monitored at a higher level.   
 In the third part of the water-jar task, the final three problems, the participants will 
have their analytical and complex problem solving skills tested by attempting to solve 
problems which have only complex solutions, and which increase in difficulty from one 
problem to the next. Creativity, which is essential for complex problem solving, is 
defined as the ability to transcend traditional ideas, rules, patterns, relationships, or the 
like, and to create meaningful new ideas, forms, methods, and interpretations.
15
 Creativity 
in this context will be even more difficult because research has shown that once a mental 
set has been established in past problems, one will likely continuously attempt to apply 
the rule until they have a moment of insight (see Knoblich et al. 2008) and realize that 
that past rules are ineffective (Fantino et. al 2003).  
 Researchers have noted that when individuals use an established rule to solve 
problems, they have difficulty solving problems when the established rule no longer 
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works as a viable solution (Smith and Blankenship 1991). For example, Schultz and 
Searlemen (1998) found that, under stress, participants took an average of 43 seconds to 
work the pattern solution problems once they had established a pattern, but it took them 
an average of 64 seconds to solve simpler problems that did not have the pattern solution, 
after they were accustomed to the pattern solution. Additionally, 26% of their participants 
could not solve the simpler problems at all, in the time allotted. Given the time 
constraints in the current study (120 seconds) and the fact that all the previous problems 
can be answered using one (if the participant has Einstellung blindness) or two (if the 
participant does not have Einstellung blindness) simple rules, the added stress of being 
monitored should decrease the participant’s ability to solve complex problem. This leads 
to the third hypothesis.  
H3: Individuals who are monitored at a higher level will solve fewer complex 
problems than those who are not monitored at a higher level.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This experiment was carried out in a computer lab at large public university. 
Twelve sessions were held, each with either 9 or 10 participants. A diverse group of 114 
adult volunteers participated, recruited through the university email newsletter, flyers, 
and word of mouth. Participants self-registered online and chose the session date and 
time they preferred. Upon arrival, they were given a short demographic questionnaire, as 




The sessions were pre-assigned to one of three monitoring treatments: electronic 
monitoring as the most intense treatment,
16
 human monitoring as a mid-level treatment, 
and trust (no monitoring) as a low-level treatment. When the participants arrived they 
were provided a consent form and demographic questionnaire. Table 3.1 shows the 
demographics of the participants. Next, their attention was directed to the white board 
where the task schedule and compensation plan were explained. With respect to the task 
schedule, the participants worked on a data-correction task, for a flat wage, for 
approximately 27 minutes, before working on the water-jar task. The prior task was used 
to acclimate the participants to their monitoring treatment and the environment in 
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 While electronic monitoring and traditional human monitoring have the same fundamental 
purpose, past research suggest that the pervasive, continuous nature of electronic monitoring often elicits 















Male 19 17 18 54 47%
Female 19 21 20 60 53%
114 100%
Age
18-24 23 26 18 67 59%
Over 24 15 12 20 47 41%
114 100%
Student Nationality
Domestic 23 24 21 68 60%
International 14 10 12 36 32%
Not a Student 1 4 5 10 9%
114 100%
Business Student
Business Student 14 11 11 36 32%
Non-Business Student 23 23 21 67 59%
Not a Student 1 4 6 11 10%
114 100%
College Level
Fresh/Soph 19 18 8 45 39%
Junior/Senior 13 8 12 33 29%
Graduate 5 8 10 23 20%
Not a Student 1 4 8 13 11%
114 100%
Good at Mental Math
Yes 23 29 20 72 63%
No 15 9 18 42 37%
114 100%
Note: This table shows the key demographics for each treatment group.  The Mental Math 










Participants in the electronic monitoring treatment had a small webcam facing 
their workstation keyboard and papers when they arrived, as shown in Appendix B. 
Participants in this electronically monitored group received all the same task instructions 
as the other two groups, except they were told “you are being monitored with webcams 
so we can observe your work and make sure you follow the instructions as given.”
17
 
Unbeknownst to the participants, the webcams were not activated. However, the 
experimenter and research assistant sat prominently at a corner workstation that the 
subjects believed to be the “monitoring station.” The station was manned for the entire 
task period. 
 Participants in the human-monitored group received all the same task instructions 
as the other two groups, except they were told that “I will walk around the room so I can 
observe your work and make sure you follow the instructions as given.” The researcher 
and the research assistant wandered around the room and passively observed the 
participants during the task time.  
 Participants in the trust treatment received all the same task instructions as the 
other groups, but were told “you will not be watched and we believe you will follow 
instructions as given.” In this treatment, all research personnel left the room and returned 
when time was up. 
 When the water-jar task began, the students were given answer sheets and 
instructed to open the water-jar task slideshow on their computer. The researcher then 
introduced the participants to the task and walked them through the first two examples, 
which had the answers already entered on the answer sheet, as shown at the bottom of 
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 This wording used in the participant instructions is based on the wording used in the study by 
Enzle and Anderson (1993). Their study looked at the effects of controlling versus non-controlling 




Appendix G. The last two examples were worked with the participants, who had to enter 
the answers on the answer sheet. The researcher made sure that everyone entered answers 
for the example problems correctly before allowing the problem portion of the task to 
begin. The four example problems ensured that each participant had at least a basic 
understanding of how to complete the task before being allowed to proceed to the actual 
problems. 
 The actual experimental task consisted of twelve problems. Participants had a two 
minute time limit on each problem
18
 and were instructed to move on if they ran out of 
time, or as soon as they solved the problem. They were told that they would be 
compensated based on the number of correct solutions they gave, and that if more than 
one solution to a problem was found then the simplest solution, the one with the least 
moves, was the correct one. If they finished the task quickly they were to sit quietly until 
time was up. 
RESULTS 
Pattern Recognition 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that individuals who are monitored at a higher level will more 
often fail to recognize and use a pattern than those who are not monitored at a higher 
level. In this experiment, one was considered to have recognized and used the pattern if 
they correctly answered at least 5 of the 6 pattern problems given in the task (the first six 
problems had the B-A-C-C
19
 solution). With respect to monitoring levels, as discussed 
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 The participants had two minutes to solve each problem. At the bottom of each problem was a 
timer bar that filled up, to mark the time. When the bar became full a bell sounded and the words “click to 
the next slide” appeared across the screen. 
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above, electronic monitoring was the most intense treatment, human monitoring was a 
mid-level treatment, and trust (no monitoring) was a low-level treatment. 
 Out of the 114 participants, 79 recognized and used the pattern solution correctly, 
while 35 did not. Table 3.2, Panel A, shows summarizes the number of participants who 
recognized the pattern, by treatment. Seven people in the trust treatment failed to 
recognize the pattern, 12 in the human monitoring treatment, and 16 in the electronic 
monitoring treatment. A Chi-square analysis of the table (bottom of Panel A) shows that 
pattern recognition was not independent of monitoring treatment (p= .081). In addition 
the effect seems to occur exactly as hypothesized, with pattern recognition negatively 
related to monitoring intensity. Using Somers’ d, a directional test of association of one 
ordinal/ranked measure (treatment) and one nominal measure (pattern recognition), 
shows the relationship is significant (p=.02; seen at the bottom of Panel A).  
 Self-perceived mental math ability is positively associated with pattern 
recognition (p= .01; analysis not shown) and the treatment groups were imbalanced with 
respect to mental math ability, as shown in Table 3.1. Of individuals in the electronic 
monitoring treatment, 47% indicated on the demographic questionnaire that they were not 
good at mental math, compared to 24% for the trust treatment, and 39% for the human 
monitored treatment. To consider mental math ability and monitoring treatment together, 
a logistic regression is used where the dependent variable is binary for pattern 
recognition, and monitoring treatment and mental math ability (binary) are the 
independent variables. Panel B shows that, after controlling for mental math ability, 




recognition (p= .096), and electronic monitoring decreases pattern recognition (p= .012). 


























Pattern Recognition by Treatment Group 
Panel A: Pattern Recognition by Treatment
Treatment No Yes Total
Trust 7 31 38
Human Monitoring 12 26 38
Electronic Monitoring 16 22 38
Total 35 79 114
Pearson Chi² = 5.03
Somers' d =  -0.158
Panel B: Logistic Regression of Treatment and Mental Math on Pattern Recognition
114
Log likelhihood -64.49 5.440
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.001
Variable Coef. Std. Error Z P>|z|
Mental Math 1.11 0.44 2.51 0.012
Electronic Monitoring -1.15 0.55 -2.10 0.036
Human Monitored -0.95 0.57 -1.66 0.096




Note: Panel A of this table shows the number of participants who recognized the pattern 
solution of the water-jar task, by treatment group. A participant is considered to have 
recognized the pattern if they got at least six of the seven pattern problems correct. 
Panel B shows a logistic regression of the data in Panel A but also controls for the 
participant's self-reported mental math abiltiy (binary), as reported on the 




       _cons      .908211   .4700993     1.93   0.053    -.0131667    1.829589
     treat_2    -.9511733   .5720266    -1.66   0.096    -2.072325    .1699782
     treat_3    -1.152273   .5480717    -2.10   0.036    -2.226473    -.078072
  MentalMath     1.113568    .443518     2.51   0.012     .2442887    1.982847
                                                                              
     Pattern        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -64.485924                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0827
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0087
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      11.63








 Hypothesis 2 stated that individuals who are monitored at a higher level will have 
Einstellung blindness more than individuals who are not monitored at a higher level.  In 
this experiment, an individual is considered to have Einstellung blindness if they answer 
Problem 7, the first dual answer problem, with pattern answer (B-A-C-C) instead of the 
simpler solution (A-C). The simpler solution was the correct solution, as the participants 
were instructed to use the simplest answer available. 
 Of the 114 participants, 51 failed to see the simpler solution and instead used the 
pattern solution (Einstellung blindness), 55 properly used the simpler solution, and eight 
used neither the simpler solution nor the pattern solution (missed the problem 
completely). If Einstellung blindness is the cause for roughly half of the participants 
continuing to use the pattern solution, then there should be a positive correlation between 
pattern recognition/use and Einstellung blindness, since one could not be blinded by a 
pattern they were not relying upon. Panel A of Table 3.3 confirms this proposition. Of the 
51 participants who were blind to the simpler solution, 45 recognized and used the 
pattern solution correctly and 6 did not. Of the 55 participants who were not blind to the 
simpler solution 33 recognized and used the pattern solution correctly and 22 did not. A 
Chi-square analysis (bottom of Panel A) shows that the effect of pattern recognition on 
Einstellung blindness is significant (p= .001). 
 Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the number of Einstellung blindness participants by 
treatment, isolated to those who recognized and used the pattern solution. The table 
shows that the participants in the trust treatment were less susceptible to Einstellung 
blindness than those in the other two treatments. In all, 51% (17/33) of those who 




while 31% (14/45) of those who recognized the pattern but did suffer Einstellung 
blindness were in the trust treatment. A Chi-square analysis of the table (bottom of Panel 
B) shows that Einstellung blindness was not independent of monitoring treatment (p= 
.022). However, the effect does not seem to occur exactly as hypothesized (with pattern 
recognition negatively related to monitoring intensity). It seems that the Einstellung 
blindness is more likely in the human monitoring than in the electronic monitoring. Using 
Somers’ d, as a directional measure of association of one ordinal/ranked measure 
(treatment) and one nominal measure (Einstellung blindness), shows the relationship is 
not significant (p= .478) when monitoring intensity is ranked (bottom of Panel B). 
 Panel C of Table 3.3 shows the results for a logistic regression examining the 
effects of the monitoring treatment on Einstellung blindness (binary) while controlling 
for the effects pattern recognition (binary) and self-reported mental math ability (binary). 
The results show that mental math ability is negatively related to Einstellung blindness 
(p= .10), while pattern recognition is positively related to Einstellung blindness (p< .001). 
The human monitoring treatment is positively associated with Einstellung blindness (p= 
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 The regression in Panel C of Table 3.3 yields similar results, with respect to the monitoring 
treatments, when using only the 78 participants who recognized the pattern, and omitting pattern 




Overall, the evidence supports Hypothesis 2, which states that individuals who are 
monitored at a higher level will have Einstellung blindness more than those who are not 
monitored at a higher level. While questions remain as to why participants in electronic 
monitoring treatment were less susceptible to Einstellung blindness than the human 
monitoring treatment, there is little doubt that monitoring affected this area of problem 









Einstellung Blindness by Pattern Recognizers and Treatment Group 
Panel A: Blindness by Pattern Recognition
Pattern Recognition No Yes Total
No 22 6 28
Yes 33 45 78
Total 55 51 106
Pearson Chi² = 10.85
Fisher's Exact
Panel B: Einstellung Blindness by Treatment for Pattern Recognizers
Treatment No Yes Total
Trust 17 14 31
Human Monitoring 5 20 25
Electronic Monitoring 11 11 22
Total 33 45 78
Pearson Chi² = 7.62
Somers' d  = 0.69
106
Log likelhihood -62.14 22.510
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.000
Variable Coef. Std. Error Z P>|z|
Mental Math -0.81 0.49 -1.64 0.100
Pattern Recognition 2.09 0.59 3.55 0.000
Electronic Monitoring 0.19 0.53 0.35 0.724
Human Monitored 1.61 0.57 2.81 0.005
Constant -1.71 0.65 -0.27 0.008
Note: Panel A and B of this table show the number of participants who were 
susceptable to Einstellung blindness, by pattern recognition and treatment, 
respectively. A participant is considered to have Einstellung blindness if they 
gave the pattern answer to Problem 7 instead of the simpler answer. Panel C 
shows a logistic regression of the data in Panel A and B, but also controls for the 
participant's self-reported mental math abiltiy (binary), as reported on the 











Panel C: Logistic Regression of Treatment, Mental Math, and Pattern 






Complex Problem Solving 
 Hypothesis 3 states that individuals who are monitored at a higher level will solve 
fewer complex problems than those who are not monitored at a higher level. In this 
experiment, the last three problems had increasingly complex answers. The answers to 
Problem 10, 11, and 12 were B-A+C, B-C-C+A, and A+C+C+C+C, respectively.
21
 Few 
participants answered all three of these problems correctly, given the time constraints 
(120 seconds) and the fact that all the previous problems could be answered using one or 
two simple rules.  
 Of the 114 participants, 9 (7.8%) did not answer any of the three correctly, 47 
(41.2%) answered 1 of the three correctly, 43 (37.7%) answered two of the three 
correctly, 13 (11.4%) answered all three correctly, and 2 (1.7%) participants did not 
follow directions (spent more than 120 seconds on one or more of these three problems). 
However, Panel A of Table 3.4 shows little difference in the average number of complex 
problems solved across groups. Participants solved 1.49 complex problems on average in 
the trust treatment, 1.53 in the in the human monitoring treatment, and 1.59 in the 
electronic monitoring treatment. A linear regression of monitoring treatment on the 
number of complex problems solved, as shown in Panel B of Table 3.4, confirms that, 
even after controlling for mental math ability, monitoring treatment does not seem to 
have a strong effect on complex problem solving skills. Therefore Hypothesis 3, as 
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 Given that the order of operations does not differ for addition and subtraction, different versions 




Table 3.4  
Complex Problem Solving by Treatment Group 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Complex Problem Solving
Treatment Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Trust 37 1.49 0.768 0 3
Human Monitoring 38 1.53 0.762 0 3
Electronic Monitoring 37 1.59 0.900 0 3
Total 112 1.54 0.805 0 3
Number of Observations 112 R- squared 0.01
Root MSE 0.810 Adj R-squared -0.01
Source Coef Std Err t P>|t|
Mental Math 0.171 0.163 1.05 0.295
Human Monitoring 0.016 0.189 0.08 0.934
Electronic Monitoring 0.127 0.189 0.67 0.505
Constant 1.380 0.167 8.25 0.000
Number of Observations 112 R- squared 0.10
Root MSE 0.783 Adj R-squared 0.05
Source Coef Std Err t P>|t|
Mental Math -0.481 0.265 -1.81 0.073
Human Monitoring -0.563 0.335 -1.68 0.095
Electronic Monitoring -0.508 0.279 -1.82 0.072
Mental Math*Human Monitoring 0.880 0.400 2.20 0.030
Mental Math*Electronic Monitoring 1.100 0.370 2.97 0.004
Constant 1.790 0.209 8.53 0.000
Panel C: Regression Results for the Interaction of the Monitoring Treatment 
and Mental Math Ability on Complex Problem Solving
Note: Panel A shows the summary statistics for the number of complex problems solved 
by each treatment group. Panel B shows the results for a regression of self-reported 
mental math abiltiy (binary), as reported on the demographics questionnaire, and 
monitoring treatment on complex problem solving. Panel C Shows the interaction of 
mental math ability and monitoring on complex problem solving. P-values < .05 are 
bolded; those < .10 are italicized .
Panel B: Regression Results for the Effects of Monitoring Treatment and 






 Past research suggests, however, that there may be an interaction of perceived 
ability and different types of monitoring regimes on complex problem solving ability. For 
instance, Davidson and Henderson (2000) found that the visual presence of electronic 
monitoring resulted in an easy task being performed with greater proficiency and a 
difficult task being performed with less proficiency.  In their study, when participants 
tried to solve an easy task, the presence of electronic monitoring resulted in their mood 
state becoming significantly more positive; but when solving a difficult task, electronic 
monitoring caused a more negative mood state. Therefore, for robustness, an interaction 
effect between monitoring treatment and mental math ability on complex problem 
solving is considered. 
 Panel C of Table 3.4 shows that when interactions between self-perceived mental 
math ability and monitoring treatments are considered in a regression, they are highly 
relevant. The positive interaction terms indicate that, for persons higher on self-perceived 
mental math ability, monitoring increases their performance. Hence, the effect of 
monitoring on complex problem solving depends on the person’s perceived mental math 
ability.  
 Figure 3.1 shows the predicted marginal means for the interaction. Interestingly, 
the results suggest that individuals who thought they were good at mental math and were 
monitored (human and electronic) performed very well, while those who thought they 
were good at mental math and were not monitored (trust) performed poorly. Conversely, 
individuals who were less confident in their base ability and in the trust treatment (left 
alone) performed very well, but such individuals who were monitored (human and 




are confident like to be watched, possibly lowering stress or making the task seem more 
attractive, while those who are not confident do not like to be watched, as it may raise 
stress or make the task seems less attractive. More research should be done to determine 
















Figure 3.1: Adjusted Marginal Means for the Interaction of Monitoring Treatment and 






 Creative problem solving is increasingly important in many business domains. 
While much is known about personal characteristics that are important for creative 
problem solving, less is known about how the environment affects an individual’s 
problem solving abilities. As such, organizations may choose their internal control 
systems without fully understanding the effects the controls will have on their employees’ 
ability to solve problems. I add to the current literature by investigating the effects of 
three different monitoring regimes (trust monitoring, human monitoring, and electronic 
monitoring) on three different areas of problem solving (pattern recognition and use, 
Einstellung blindness [pattern breaking], and complex problem solving skills).  
 The results indicate that the monitoring environment does influence individuals’ 
problem solving. For the most part, problem solving performance is negatively related to 
monitoring intensity. However, when solving complex problems, if an individual is 
confident in his or her base skills, then the negative effects of monitoring intensity may 
be mitigated or even reversed. These findings are consistent with the theory of social 
facilitation, which states that individuals have various social, physiological, behavioral, 
and cognitive reactions to being monitored, watched, or judged (Aiello and Douthitt 
2001). One common finding in the social facilitation literature is that monitoring 
undermines performance on complex tasks, and improves performance on simple tasks. 
More research should be done to determine how the awareness of social facilitation can 
be incorporated into management theory, and ultimately be used to help to improve job 
training, job design, and job performance.   
 With respect to accounting and auditing, this paper discusses an often overlooked 




fraud—Einstellung blindness. Einstellung blindness is a stealth cognitive bias related to 
problem solving rigidity and functional fixation. In short, Einstellung blindness occurs 
when one has been exposed to the same type of problem and solution so many times that 
they become cognitively blinded to any other solution. While not widely studied in recent 
business literature, the impact of Einstellung on various business- and accounting-related 
job duties (e.g., auditing, tax compliance, and managerial decision making) could be 
substantial. In this paper I show that participants who are monitored at a higher level have 
Einstellung blindness more often than those who are not monitored at a higher level. 
 Individuals in the auditing profession may be especially susceptible to Einstellung 
blindness for at least three reasons. First, auditors often repeat similar tests which yield 
similar results. Second, auditors are often under time pressure. Third, auditors usually 
have their work monitored, or are subject to monitoring during their audit tasks. More 
research should be conducted to examine if, and how, Einstellung blindness affects audit 
quality. A similar line of thought can be extended to other areas of the accounting and 
managerial domains. 
 Lastly, while a wealth of interesting research exists on the effects of financial 
incentives on performance and motivation in the managerial accounting literature 
(Bonner et al. 2000), there has been considerably less research on the effects of 
monitoring and control on motivation and performance. Since monitoring and incentives 
are thought to be the two main sources of organization control (according to traditional 
agency theory), more work should be done to develop similar knowledge on each topic. 
In this aspect, this research answers Christ et al.’s (2 12) call to further develop our 






DOES MONITORING AFFECT THE AGENT’S  
PREFERENCE FOR HONESTY? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 It is firmly established in the business literature that monitoring increases effort 
and deters dishonest behavior within a firm (e.g., Hölmstrom 1979; Jensen and Meckling 
1976). This conclusion is logical, and rational, since any self-interested agent should 
work hard and be honest to avoid the possibility of sanctions if caught shirking or being 
dishonest. Despite the importance of monitoring in the firm, there is little research in the 
accounting and managerial literature addressing the effects of monitoring and control on 
the individual psyche.
22
  or instance, how monitoring affects the agent’s attitude toward 
dishonesty and misreporting is largely an unanswered empirical question. This is an 
important issue because past research has shown that attitude is highly correlated with 
intent and future behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). Since attitude/rationalization is 
considered one of the three sides of the fraud triangle (PCAOB 2005; Cressy 1973), 
understanding the relationships among monitoring, attitudes, and (dis)honesty is vital to 
the design of internal controls, financial regulation, and the prevention of fraudulent 
behavior. 
 This study proposes that monitoring negatively affects the agent’s attitude 
towards honest reporting by “crowding out” the agent’s intrinsic motivation to be honest 
and enabling the rationalization of deviant behavior. This theory is tested by 
experimentally investigating whether the type of monitoring affects an individual’s 
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behavioral honesty. In this experimental design, participants were assigned to one of 
three monitoring treatment groups: a trust treatment,
23
 a human monitored treatment,
 24
 
and an electronically monitored treatment.
25
 Once the treatment was induced, the 
participants performed a simple mental math task where a monetary reward was given 
based upon task performance. Half the participants in each treatment group self-reported 
their results, while the other half had their results verified by the researcher. Dishonesty 
was operationalized by examining the difference in means between the “self-score 
regime” and the “verify regime” of each treatment group (see Ariely et al. 2  9 for a 
similar research design). As hypothesized, the results of the experiment show that there 
was more dishonesty in the human monitored treatment and the electronically monitored 
treatment than the trust treatment. Interestingly, less dishonesty was detected in the 
electronic monitoring treatment than the human monitored treatment. 
 Psychology research suggests that individuals can be either internally or 
externally motivated to perform a task or carry out a behavior. When an individual 
already is intrinsically motivated to perform a behavior, controlling or incentivizing that 
behavior may externalize the motivation (Ryan and Deci 2000; Frey and Oberholser-Gee 
1997). Externalizing intrinsic motivation can have negative consequences such that when 
the external control mechanism is removed or weakened the incentive to perform the 
behavior is diminished from its original state (Deci et al. 1999).  
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 Rousseau et al. (1998, 395) defined trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 




 Human monitoring is sometimes referred to as “traditional monitoring” in the academic 




 While electronic monitoring and traditional human monitoring have the same fundamental 
purpose, past research suggest that the pervasive, continuous nature of electronic monitoring often elicits 




 Researchers across multiple disciplines have found that most individuals are 
intrinsically motivated to be honest, and behave as if there is a “cost of lying” that must 
be covered before a lie is told (Lundquist et al. 2007; Gibson et al. 2012; Gneezy 2005). 
Although individuals behave as if there is a cost of lying, for most people that cost is not 
high; most individuals will lie for a small amount of gain (Gneezy 2005; Baiman and 
Lewis 1989). This suggests that there is a trade-off between being honest (internal 
gratification) and receiving a payoff by being dishonest. Empirical research suggests that 
personal characteristics and situational circumstances determine the point at which a lie 
becomes acceptable for each person.
26
 Ariely et al. (2009) posit, in their theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance, that individuals are only honest enough (partially honest) to 
convince themselves of their own integrity. They state that “a little bit of dishonesty gives 
a taste of profit without spoiling a positive self-view” (p. 3).This finding is consistent 
with several experiments which show that individuals are more likely to be a little 
dishonest than completely honest or completely dishonest. These two streams of research, 
together, suggest that individuals will lie for a small amount of gain, but will limit the 
impact of, or gain from, their lie to a certain threshold so that the lie does not alter their 
self-image. If monitoring negatively alters one’s attitude toward honesty, facilitating 
rationalization of fraudulent behavior, then it is likely that it will also cause individuals to 
lower their threshold for dishonesty (“cost of lying”), and to the extent that rationalization 
allows one to be dishonest and still maintain their positive self-image, monitoring will 
also increase ones capacity for ill-gotten gains.  
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 Several researchers have looked at the causes of deviant behaviors such as lying and 
misreporting. Personal characteristics such as Machiavellianism (Fulmer et al. 2009; Murphy 2012) and 
self-control (Ariely et al. 2009) along with situational characteristics such as the business climate 
(Crutchley et al. 2007) and controls (Tayler and Bloomfield 2011) have been examined recently in the 




 By examining the effects of monitoring on behavior, this research answers Christ 
et al.’s (2 12) call to further develop our understanding of the potential consequences of 
formal controls. Also, by positing that monitoring affects the participant’s attitude toward 
misreporting, leading to rationalization, I heed the call of Hogan et al. (2008) to design 
studies in which multiple elements of the fraud triangle are examined simultaneously. As 
discussed above, the evidence suggests there may be a natural tension between the effects 
of control mechanisms and the externalization of intrinsic motivation. Thus, an attempt to 
reduce one side of the triangle (opportunity) through monitoring may weaken another 
side of the triangle (rationalization). The understanding of the relationship between these 
two opposing forces is important to the design of effective regulation and internal 
controls.  
 This study continues an interesting line of research in the accounting literature 
that is concerned with how the business environment can influence an individual’s 
propensity to commit fraudulent or deviant behavior in accounting and managerial related 
domains. With regard to the “fraud triangle,” researchers are interested in the 
rationalization and attitudes related to dishonest behavior, whether they are developed 
through the tone at the top (Rezaee 2005), contract design (Evans et al. 2001), the vertical 
and horizontal equity of compensation (Matuszewski 2010), personality traits (Murphy 
2012), or other factors. The current research adds to the managerial accounting literature 
by investigating the possibility that monitoring, which is meant to prevent dishonest 
behavior, may actually promote dishonesty, under some circumstances, by making it 




 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides more theory and 
background, Section III develops the hypothesis, Section IV describes the research 
design, Section V provides the results, and Section VI gives the summary and conclusion.  
THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
 For the most part, honesty in the accounting and finance literature is discussed in 
the framework of agency theory and/or fraud prevention. In both of these frameworks, 
monitoring is usually viewed in a positive light, where the only restraint on monitoring 
and control is the monetary limits of the principal (e.g., Zajac and Westphal 1994; 
Hansen 1997). However, some research suggests that that there are “hidden costs,” and 
unanticipated effects, of monitoring and control. Some of these costs and effects derive 
from the fact that, given an acceptable option or alternative, people will choose not to be 
controlled. In other words, as a person’s autonomy is removed, their internal motivation 
to cooperate with the authority is diminished (Spector 1986). However, the implicit costs 
of control are not well understood and are rarely considered in theoretical models. This 
paper addresses one dimension of these costs by looking at the effects of monitoring on 
the agent’s behavioral honesty. 
Honesty in Economics and Psychology   
 Honesty in the psychology literature is often contrasted with the view of honesty 
in the economics literature. The standard economic perspective of behavior is one of 
homo economicus, where the individual is a rational and selfish entity interested only in 
maximizing their own external payoffs. For homo economicus, the decision to be honest, 
or dishonest, depends only on the expected benefit versus the expected cost. This cost-




individuals face. For homo economicus, all else equal, an increase in reward will always 
increase a behavior, while an increase in punishment, or cost, will always decrease a 
behavior. 
 In contrast, the psychology literature holds that in addition to the external reward 
mechanisms, there also exist internal reward mechanisms and that these internal rewards 
influence individuals’ decisions. The external and the internal reward mechanisms 
interact to determine if, and to what extent, an individual performs a behavior. From this 
interaction there is a non-linear relationship between honesty and the reward for being 
dishonest (see Ariely et al. 2008). However, because of differences in individual values, 
preferences, and cognition, the functional relationship between honesty and the reward 




 Gneezy (2005), in a simple game where one participant had the option to tell the 
truth or lie to another participant about the payoff from various options that they would 
split, found that the decision maker uses the “truth telling” outcome as a reference level 
when evaluating the benefits of lying. The monetary consequences of the lie are 
compared to this reference level. The decision maker is selfish in the sense of 
maximizing their own payoffs, but sensitive to the cost the lie imposes on the other side. 
Sensitivity diminishes with the size of payoffs. Moreover, since the perception of the 
counterpart’s cost is subjective, when there are differences in wealth as in employee-
employer relationship or a consumer-insurer relationship, the lower wealth decision 
maker is more likely to be dishonest.  
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 In the article titled “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small Scale 
Societies,” Henrich et al. (2  1) test individuals from different types of societies to determine how much 




  Since some behaviors, such as an individual’s concern for the counter-party, are 
not consistent with the characteristics of homo economicus, additional theories have been 
developed to help account for the discrepancies between economic-rationality and actual 
human behavior. For example, the theory of Self-Concept Maintenance (Ariely et al. 
2008) posits that individuals are practically always in a win-lose situation where every 
decision is a trade-off between being honest and receiving an intrinsic reward or gaining 
from deception. However, instead of making a decision to be honest or dishonest, 
individuals usually look for a compromise. Individuals are often dishonest, but they limit 
their dishonest activity to a point where they do not have to change their own self-
perception. The theory posits that the changing of one’s self-perception is undesirable, or 
costly; but being partially honest offers the individual the “best of both worlds,” gaining 
from dishonesty but still perceiving themself to be an honest and ethical person. The 
theory of Self-Concept Maintenance is pertinent to the study of “monitoring and honesty” 
because the type of monitoring may affect the internal threshold of dishonest behavior 
one can engage in and not have to update their self-identity. 
Honesty and Agency Theory 
 Agency theory is the most comprehensive and widely accepted theory in 
managerial research and organizational design. Agency theory is useful in research, and 
practice, because it makes explicit predictions about how individuals are likely to behave 
under different contractual designs. To arrive at such predictions, agency theorists make 
assumptions about the people involved in the contracts, the entities offering and 
accepting the contracts, and the informational environment (Eisenhardt 1989). One of the 




self-interested, similar to homo economicus. Accordingly, a great deal of research has 
looked at relaxing this strict assumption (see Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. [2012] for a recent 
review). For example, researchers have found that the inclusion of trust (Beccerra and 
Gupta 1999), reciprocity (Kuang and Moser 2009), and social norms (Fehr and Falk 
2002) into agency theory can dramatically alter the predicted outcomes of contracts.  
 Interestingly, experimental managerial accounting research has been a fruitful 
area for the study of behavioral agency theory models. Participative budget experiments, 
in particular, offer a unique setting where the information environment and/or the 
incentive structure of contracts, in the principal-agent relationship, can be manipulated 
and the effects of the manipulation on the agent’s reporting and production decisions can 
be measured (Brown et al. 2009). This research is unique in the business literature 
because it allows researchers to empirically examine some determinants of honesty in an 
organizational setting. While more than two dozen published participative budget 
experiments in the managerial accounting literature over the past twenty years have 
addressed managerial reporting,
28
 here, I review a few papers from a widely cited line of 
work that deals explicitly with honesty.  
 Evans et al. (2  1) specifically examined how agents’ preferences for honesty and 
wealth affect their reporting of private information. In their experiment the managers 
(participants) privately observe the cost of production and report it to the principal, who 
provides the amount requested. The agent keeps any surplus from over reporting and 
cannot be auditing or monitored. Interestingly, they found that, of the available surplus 
that the agent could have kept with impunity, the agents actually returned 47.6% through 
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full or partial honesty. Evans et al. (2001) compare their results to the average of several 
dictator game experiments, where a participant simply decides how much of total sum to 
share with a person they have never met but has entrusted them with gains. In the dictator 
games the participants give back, on average, 18% of their gains. They attribute the 
difference, between budget experiment (47.6%) and dictator experiment (18%), to the 
fact that in the budget experiment the participant had to tell a lie to receive the surplus, in 
which case their preference for honesty, or partial honesty, affected their gain.
29
  
 Hannan et al. (2006) examine honesty in the participative budget setting under 
different levels of information asymmetry, while maintaining the trust setting from Evans 
et al. (2001). In their experiment the main variable was the precision of an information 
system (coarse or precise) that signaled the actual costs to the principal, although the 
principal has no power to deter dishonesty. They show that agents' reporting decisions are 
affected by how they trade off the psychological benefits of appearing honest against the 
economic benefits of misrepresentation. The precision of the information system affects 
the agent's trade-off by changing the ability of the principal to infer the agent's level of 
honesty. They find that honesty is lower under a precise information system than under a 
coarse information system because the incremental cost of appearing honest is higher 
with a precise system.  
 Rankin et al. (2008) extend the findings of Evans et al. (2001) and Hannan et al. 
(2006) by distinguishing more clearly whether agents' tendency to report private 
information more truthfully, despite an economic incentive to be dishonest, is due to 
honesty or to other non-pecuniary motivations such as fairness or reciprocity. They 
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 Fredrickson and Cloyd (1998) had similar findings and concluded, from agents' self-reported 
motivations, that personal integrity is the most important factor limiting slack in their experimental 




manipulate whether the agent's budget report does or does not require a factual assertion, 
noting that while fairness preferences could come into play in both conditions, honesty 
should come into play only when agents are required to make a factual assertion. They 
find more honest reporting when a factual assertion is required, indicating an incremental 
effect of honesty beyond other non-pecuniary preferences. In addition, Rankin et al. 
(2008) examine whether their finding holds when the principal rather than the agent has 
final budget authority. They find that the incremental effect of honesty is no longer 
significant when the principal has final budget authority. They also provide evidence 
suggesting that this may be because agents frame the situation as an ethical dilemma 
when the agent has final authority, but as a negotiation in which each party acts in his or 
her self-interest when the principal has final authority. 
 Overall, the evidence from the managerial accounting literature suggests that, all 
else equal, agents have a preference for partial honesty when there is a reward for lying. 
Agents will limit their dishonesty because they also have a preference for non-pecuniary 
benefits such as fairness, reciprocity, and honesty. The results of these experiments show 
the complexity of human decision making by suggesting that people “want their cake and 
they want to eat it too.” 
 A common element of many of the participative budget experiments is the use of 
low monitoring to measure innate honesty. The study presented in this paper is unique 
because it attempts to measure how different monitoring environments affect honesty. I 
posit that monitoring makes it easier for agents to rationalize dishonesty when the 
opportunity arises, which may lead to an increase in dishonest behavior in environments 




Honesty, Fraud, and Internal Controls 
 Fraud prevention and internal controls are concerned with preventing financial 
crimes, deterring misreporting, and safeguarding firm assets. Fraud involves intentional 
acts and is perpetrated by human beings using deception, trickery, and cunning 
(Ramamoorti 2  8). Since fraud involves people’s capacity to deceive, and be deceived, 
it is important to understand the psychological factors that might influence these types of 
behavior. Therefore, most work related to honesty and fraud prevention, or internal 
controls, is concerned with how and why individuals commit acts of fraud and deceit in 
the workplace or financial markets. 
 Despite increases in regulation and ethical training in the post Sarbanes-Oxley 
era, fraud and misreporting continue to be a pertinent threat to capital markets and 
internal controls (Hogan et al. 2008). Behavioral research, which exposes some short-
comings of theories based on economic rationality, suggests regulation and punishment 
may not affect decision making as much as previously thought. Further, ethical training 
may not be as effective if individuals delude themselves of their moral identity as the 
theory of Self-Concept Maintenance suggests. In light of the increases in reported fraud 
and financial crime, regulators have called for more research on the how to prevent or 
detect fraud (Hogan et al. 2008). 
 In their 2009 Global Economic Survey, PricewaterhouseCoopers described fraud 
and misreporting as pervasive, persistent, and pernicious.
30
 Thirty percent of the 3,037 
respondents reported dealing with either fraud or misreporting, at some level, over the 
past year. They also report that the amount of misreporting caught by internal controls in 
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trending down over time. Also, only 7% of misreporting and fraud cases were initially 
discovered by whistleblowing-related activity. In addition to the uptick in financial fraud 
reported in the PWC survey, the SEC Enforcement Division announced that in 2011 it 
filed the most enforcement actions ever in a single year.
 31
 The evidence suggests that, 
despite the massive amount of resources spent on fraud prevention in the past ten years, 
fraud and misreporting are no less pervasive than they were before. 
 Statement on Auditing Standards 99, issued by the Auditing Standards Board of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in October 2002, 
describes the fraud triangle. The fraud triangle is used by auditors to assess fraud risk 
because, generally, the three fraud triangle conditions (incentive, opportunity, and 
rationalization) are present when fraud occurs. First, there is an incentive or pressure that 
provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, there is an opportunity, and ability, for fraud 
to be perpetrated (e.g., absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of 
management to override controls.) Third, the individuals committing the fraud possess an 
attitude that enables them to rationalize the fraud.  
 Hogan et al. (2008) suggest that, unlike incentive and opportunity, rationalization 
has received little attention from researchers. This research posits that monitoring affects 
an individual’s attitude toward misreporting. Attitude is highly correlated with intent 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 2005), which triggers action and rationalization. Rationalization is 
described by Tsang (2002) as the cognitive process that individuals use to convince 
themselves that their behavior does not violate their moral standards. The way the fraud 
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triangle is conceptualized may need to be re-evaluated if it is shown that increased 
monitoring makes it easier to rationalize misreporting.  
 The standard assumption of the fraud triangle is that incentives and pressure 
motivate misreporting while lax controls facilitate misreporting (Hogan et al. 2008). 
Individuals are generally viewed as being predisposed to character traits that partially 
determine the extent to which they rationalize their deviant behavior (Murphy 2012). 
However, the theory proposed in this paper is that not only do incentives promote 
misreporting but strong controls may also promote deviant behavior by crowding out the 
intrinsic motivation to be honest, making it easier to rationalize dishonest behavior. A 
similar line of thought was explored by Belot and Schröder (2013). In their research 
experiment participants were hired for a job which had several options for deviant 
behavior (poor performance, tardiness, or theft). They found that increasing monitoring 
on one measure (performance) led to increased deviance in another measure (tardiness). 
They concluded that workers do “retaliate” in some way for being monitored.  
 The findings in this line of research have implications for the study, not only of 
managerial misreporting, but also whistleblowing, collusion, and worker satisfaction. As 
the recent wave of public accountants involved in insider trading scandals has shown, 
most fraud involves several collaborators—inside the firm, and sometimes outside the 
firm—who turn a blind eye to the unethical behavior (Burns and Kedia 2008). Often the 
collaborators and potential whistleblowers have different incentives, attitudes, and 
personality traits, but are subject to the same monitoring mechanisms. Their attitudes 
toward the monitoring systems may be a driver in their decisions to coalesce for or 





 The fraud triangle suggests that the three conditions of incentive, opportunity, and 
rationalization are present when an individual commits a fraudulent act. The incentive is 
generally monetary in nature, while opportunity is generally conceptualized as the 
perception that one can perpetrate the fraud while not getting caught (Murphy and Dacin 
2011). Agency theory assumes that all individuals have a natural predisposition toward 
fraud, and once an individual has the incentive and the opportunity to commit fraud, the 
rationalization is as simple as a cost-benefit calculation. However, and as psychology 
theories suggest, prior accounting literature has shown that individuals act more honestly 
than agency theory would predict (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Hannan et al. 2006), suggesting 
that other influences, such as past experience and the environment, impact individuals’ 
ability to commit and rationalize fraudulent behavior. 
 Researchers have identified several categories of rationalization that are often 
employed by perpetrators, such as moral justification, advantageous comparison, 
euphemistic labeling, minimization of the act, denial of the victim, and diffusion of 
responsibility (Murphy and Dacin 2011). However, understanding how individuals 
rationalize fraudulent behavior does not fully explain what characteristics of the 
environment, or situation, prompted the individuals to act out the deviant behavior. After 
all, most individuals in a position to commit fraud have a good reputation (Anand et al. 
2004) which facilitates their ability to deceive others. In this study I posit that monitoring 
can affect an individual’s attitude toward dishonesty by crowding their intrinsic 
motivation to be honest and increasing their ability to rationalize deviant behavior, as 















Figure 4.1 Theoretical Model 
  
 
On any particular task, misreporting is directly influenced by the level of 
monitoring on the person reporting. For example, individuals may be inclined to cheat 
under 100% monitoring, but one is unlikely to cheat, misreport, or be dishonest if they 
know for certain they will be caught. However, not misreporting does not mean that one 
does not have an inclination to misreport. This inclination may be an important factor in 
the decision making process when the opportunity to cheat arises. 
 Trust and reciprocity have been widely studied in the economics literature (see 
Fehr and   chter 1998). One robust conclusion from this research is that when 
individuals are trusted they reciprocate with trustworthy behavior (for example, Fehr et 
al. 1993; Berg et al. 1995; McCabe et al. 2003). Conversely, research on monitoring and 
















 (Cialdini 1996; Falk and Kosfeld 2006). This signal of distrust may 
lower the agent’s internal motivation to treat the principal fairly and increase the agent’s 
ability to rationalize dishonest behavior. Based on this logic I derive the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis: When controls are removed or weakened, dishonest behavior will be 
higher in an environment where monitoring intensity is higher. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
  This experiment was carried out in a computer lab at a large public university. 
Using a 3X2 experimental design, where each cell included 19 participants, each of the 
114 participants was subjected to one of three monitoring treatments and one of two 
reporting regimes. Each of the six treatment combinations included two sessions, for a 
total of 12 research sessions, with each session including either 9 or 10 participants. The 
session dates and times were pre-assigned, and participants self-registered online for the 
session they preferred. 
 Participants were recruited through the university email newsletter, flyers, and 
word of mouth. A diverse group 114 adult volunteers participated. Table 4.1 shows the 
demographics collected from the participants with a short demographics questionnaire, as 
shown in Appendix A, given upon arrival.  
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 The signaling of trust and distrust is important in many domains. For example, Mahar (2003) 
discusses how many people do not show interest in prenuptial agreements because they do not want to 






Table 4.1  





Reporting Regime Self Verified Self Verified Self Verified Total Percent
Gender
Male 9 10 9 8 8 10 54 47%
Female 10 9 10 11 11 9 60 53%
114 100%
Age
18-24 12 11 11 15 7 11 67 59%
Over 24 7 8 8 4 12 8 47 41%
114 100%
Student Nationality
Domestic 8 15 13 11 9 12 68 60%
International 11 3 3 7 8 4 36 32%
Not a Student 0 1 3 1 2 3 10 9%
114 100%
Business Student
Business Student 9 5 6 5 8 3 36 32%
Non-Business Student 10 13 10 13 8 13 67 59%
Not a Student 0 1 3 1 3 3 11 10%
114 100%
College Level
Fresh/Soph 9 10 6 12 3 5 45 39%
Junior/Senior 7 6 6 2 7 5 33 29%
Graduate 3 2 4 4 6 4 23 20%
Non Student 0 1 3 1 3 5 13 11%
114 100%
Mental Math
Yes 9 14 15 14 10 10 72 63%
No 10 5 4 5 9 9 42 37%
114 100%
Tired
Yes 7 9 5 8 8 6 43 38%
No 12 10 14 11 11 13 71 62%
114 100%
the Tired category shows the answer to the question, I feel tired today.
Note: Each of the 6 combinations of monitoring treatment and reporting regime had 19 participants. The Mental
Treatment Trust Monitored Human Monitored Electronically Monitored




 After administering the demographic questionnaire, the researcher explained the 
work schedule and compensation for the participants. The participants in this experiment 
had just spent an hour performing two distractor tasks in other experiments not related to 
the honesty test. These tasks served to accustom the participants to the environment, 
induce the monitoring treatment, and conceal the fact that their honesty was being tested. 
In the first distractor task, participants spent about 27 minutes performing a clerical task 
where they corrected data in a spreadsheet, for a flat $10 wage. In the second distractor 
task the participants spent about 24 minutes solving logic puzzles for a piecewise wage 
up to $3. The task that tested their honesty in the current study is explained in detail 
below. 
 The monitoring treatments were the same ones to which the participants had 
become accustomed. Individuals in the electronic monitoring treatment had one small 
webcam facing their workstation keyboard and papers when they arrived, as shown in 
Appendix B. The electronically monitored group received all the same task instructions 
as the other two groups, except they were told that “you are being monitored with 
webcams so we can observe your work and make sure you follow the instructions as 
given.”
33
 Unbeknownst to the participants, the webcams were not activated. However, the 
experimenter and research assistant sat prominently at a corner workstation, which the 
subjects believed was the “monitoring station,” while all the tasks were completed.  
 Participants in the human monitored group were subjected to traditional human 
monitoring and received all the same task instructions as the other two groups, except 
they were told that “I will walk around the room so I can observe your work and make 
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 This wording used in the instructions is based on the wording used in a similar study by Enzle 
and Anderson (1993). Their study looked at the effects of controlling versus non-controlling electronic 




sure you follow the instructions as given.” The researcher and the research assistant 
wandered around the room and passively observed the participants during all the tasks. 
 Individuals in the trust treatment received all the same task instructions as the 
other groups. However, they were told that “you will not be watched and we believe you 
will follow instructions as given.” All research personnel then left the room and returned 
when time was up for each task.  
 The task for this experiment was a short math puzzle. Following Ariely et al. 
(2009), participants were given a sheet of paper with 20 numeric matrices, as shown in 
Appendix H. Each matrix contained 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 4.29, 3.23). Participants 
had 5 minutes to find the unique two numbers that add to 10.00 in as many matrices as 
possible. Participants were told, truthfully, that all the matrices had the unique 
combination and that they could work the sheet in any manner or order they like. Also, It 
was explained that they could earn anywhere from $0 to $5 on this task, depending upon 
their performance. 
 Half the participants in each monitoring treatment were told that writing or 
marking on the paper during the work was optional, and no indication or proof that the 
combination was actually found would be required. This half of the participants self-
reported the number of matrices solved and their work was not verified. Thus, cheating 
without detection was possible. The other half of the participants in each monitoring 
treatment had to mark their papers to indicate the correct combination, and their work 
was verified. Dishonesty was operationalized as the difference in the mean scores 






  Table 4.2 shows the number of matrices reported as solved across monitoring 
treatment and reporting regimes. In the trust treatment, the participants who self-reported 
their results reported solving fewer matrixes (8.26) than the participants who knew their 
work would be verified (9.68). In the human monitoring treatment, the participants who 
self-reported their results reported solving more matrixes (11.58) than the participants 
who knew their work would be verified (8.47). Similarly, in the electronic monitoring 
treatment, participants who self-reported their results reported solving more matrixes 





Matrices Reported Solved by Treatment and Reporting Regime 
Reporting Regime Self Verified Combined Self Verified Combined Self Verified Combined ALL
Average Matrices 8.26 9.68 8.97 11.58 8.47 10.02 8.95 8.11 8.53 9.18
Std Dev 4.87 4.73 4.79 4.07 4.88 4.70 3.91 5.13 4.52 4.67
Min 0 2 0 3 1 1 4 2 2 0
Max 20 18 20 20 17 20 20 20 10 20
Obs 19 19 38 19 19 38 19 19 38 114
Note: This table shows the number of matrices reported solved for each combination of monitoring and reporting regime.








Before proceeding to the formal testing of the hypothesis it is important to note 
that there were three extraneous individual differences, from the demographic survey 
(shown in Appendix A), which were found to significantly affect the number of matrices 
reported as solved (α = .1 , untabulated). On average, males, those who said that they 
were good at mental math, and those who said that they were not tired, reported that they 
solved more matrices than females, those who said they were not good with mental math, 
and those who said they were tired. Past research suggests that these individual 
differences may have a direct effect on task performance, or interact with the treatments 
to alter performance (or reported performance). For example, some research suggests 
that, on average, males are slightly better at mental math (Hyde and Mertz. 2009), but 
some research also suggests that males are more likely to be dishonest about their 
performance (Dreber and Johannesson 2008). Being tired may affect performance, but 
past research also has shown that individual may be more dishonest about their 
performance when they are tired (Ariely et al. 2009). Moreover, tired individuals may 
feel more pressure to perform in the presence of monitoring, causing an interaction with 
the monitoring treatment. Lastly, past research has shown that monitoring intensity 
(through work-related stress) may interact with mental ability to affect performance on 
tasks (Schultz and Searleman 1998).  
 These extraneous individual differences (mental math ability, tiredness, and 
gender) should be included in the analysis to reduce error variance. As a result of the 
quasi-randomization of participants, cell sizes, after inclusion of the controls, are 
sufficient to calculate the main effects and all 2- and 3-way interaction terms.
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test indicates that the assumption of equality of error variance is not violated (p = .17), 
reducing concerns about differences in cell sizes (Neter et al. 1990).  
 Table 4.3 shows that, consistent with the hypothesis, after accounting for all the 
control variables and interactions, the monitoring treatment and reporting regime interact 
to affect the number of matrices individuals reportedly solved (p = .027). Further, this 
interaction is not affected by the other control variables (none of the three-way 
interactions including it are significant), so that I can examine this relationship without 
qualification. The other significant effects and interactions in the ANOVA do not relate 





Table 4.3  
ANOVA Results  
 
Number of Observations 114 R- squared 0.53
Adj R-squared 0.27
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 1318.71 41 32.16 2.01 0.005
Monitoring 91.38 2 45.65 2.86 0.064
Reporting 0.06 1 0.06 0.00 0.953
Tired 95.25 2 95.25 5.97 0.017
Gender 121.01 2 121.01 7.58 0.007
Mental Math 14.80 2 14.80 0.93 0.339
Monitoring*Reporting 121.41 2 60.70 3.80 0.027
Monitoring*Tired 93.10 2 46.55 2.92 0.061
Monitoring*Gender 57.10 2 28.55 1.79 0.175
Monitoring*Mental Math 187.67 2 93.84 5.88 0.004
Reporting*Tired 3.72 1 3.72 0.23 0.631
Reporting*Gender 0.12 1 0.12 0.01 0.933
Reporting*Mental Math 8.03 1 8.03 0.50 0.481
Tired*Gender 6.88 1 6.88 0.43 0.514
Tired*Mental Math 12.86 1 12.86 0.81 0.373
Gender *Mental Math 20.99 1 20.99 1.31 0.255
Monitoring*Reporting*Tired 5.76 2 2.88 0.18 0.835
Monitoring*Reporting*Gender 18.19 2 9.10 0.57 0.568
Monitoring*Reporting*Mental Math 36.07 2 18.04 1.13 0.329
Monitoring*Tired*Gender 3.31 2 1.66 0.10 0.902
Monitoring*Tired*Mental Math 2.64 1 2.64 0.17 0.686
Monitoring*Gender*Mental Math 85.61 2 42.80 2.68 0.075
Reporting*Tired*Gender 0.12 1 0.12 0.01 0.930
Reporting*Tired*Mental Math 74.67 1 74.67 4.68 0.034
Reporting*Gender*Mental Math 0.06 1 0.06 0.00 0.953
Tired *Gender* Mental Math 4.42 1 4.42 0.28 0.601
Residual 1149.78 72 15.97
Total 2468.49 113
Note: This table shows the five-way ANOVA results for the effects of Monitoring treatment (Trust, Human 
Monitoring, or Electronic Monitoring), Reporting regime (self-report or verified), and the dichotomous control 
variables self-assessed Tiredness, Gender, and self-assessed Mental Math ability on the number of Matrices the 
participants reported as solved. The Monitoring*Reporting interaction is the key effect of interest, and is 
unaffected by the control variables, as shown by the nonsignificant 3-way interactions. P-values < .05 are bolded; 








Figure 4.2 shows the adjusted means graph for each of the treatment groups. The 
slope of each line indicates the effect of verification on reported scores, which is my 
proxy for cheating. The slopes of the lines indicate that cheating may have been present 
in the human-monitored treatment, and to a lesser extent in the electronically monitored 
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   Human Monitoring
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Figure 4.2: Matrices Reported as Solved: Results by Reporting Regime and Monitoring 
Treatment 
 
Note: Participants either were allowed to self-report without verification, or their reports 
were documented and verified. Means are adjusted for Tired, Gender, and Mental Math, 








As shown in Table 4.4, a comparisons of the adjusted means (shown in Figure 
4.2) reveals that the reporting regime treatments are not significantly different in the trust 
monitoring treatment (p= .593). However, the reporting regime treatment means are 
significantly different in the human monitored treatment (p= .035), and, while the graph 
does seem to indicate that cheating may have been present in the electronic monitoring 
treatment, the means are not significantly different at a high level of confidence (p= 
.275).
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 Overall, these results support my hypothesis that, given an opportunity to cheat, 




Table 4.4  
Pairwise Comparison of Adjusted Means 
 
Monitoring Treatment Self-Report Verified Difference Std. Error Sig. Lower Upper
Trust Monitoring 8.38 9.14 -0.76 1.42 0.593 -3.59 2.06
Human Monitoring 12.04 8.71 3.33 1.55 0.035 0.239 6.42
Electronic Monitoring 9.04 7.40 1.64 1.50 0.275 -1.34 4.63
Note: This table shows the pairwise comparison of the adjusted means for each reporting regime in each 
monitoring treatment. All of the comparisons were related to a planned, specific hypothesis rather than a result of 
post hoc comparisons. Consequently, the alpha level was not adjusted for the multiple comparisons. P-values < .05 
are bolded.
Reporting Regime
95% Confidence                         
Level for Difference
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 All of the measured outcomes were related to a planned, specific hypothesis rather than a result 
of post hoc comparisons. For this reasons, I did not adjust the significance level of the p values for the 
planned comparisons. This approach is consistent with guidelines for planned multiple comparisons (Fisher 







 In this study, I theorized that monitoring could crowd-out an individual’s intrinsic 
motivation to be honest. I further theorized that this loss of intrinsic motivation would 
change the individual’s attitude toward dishonesty and increase their ability to rationalize 
deviant behavior—all leading to a higher propensity toward dishonest behavior. This led 
to my hypothesis that, given an opportunity to cheat, dishonesty will be higher in an 
environment where monitoring intensity is higher. 
 To test my hypothesis, I assigned each participant in the experiment to one of 
three monitoring environments: trust monitoring, human monitoring, or electronic 
monitoring. With this treatment induced, I gave the participants a simple mental math 
task with a monetary reward based on performance. Half the participants in each 
treatment self-reported their results; while the other half had their results verified (groups 
were segregated and unaware of each other). The spread between the average reported 
performance of verified and non-verified groups was used a proxy for the incidence of 
cheating in each monitoring-treatment group (Ariely et al. 2009).  
 Dishonesty was not detected in the trust treatment, but cheating was detected in 
the human monitored treatment and—to a lesser extent—in the electronically monitored 
treatment. Therefore it appears that monitoring does affect the agent’s preference for 
honesty. Thus, I find evidence to support of my hypothesis, although questions still 
remain as to why cheating was detected in the human monitored treatment at a 
statistically significant level, but cheating was not detected at a significant level in the 




 I offer three explanations for why cheating was higher in the human monitored 
treatment than the electronically monitored treatment. First, it is possible that there was a 
strong propensity to be dishonest in the electronically monitored treatment, but the 
electronic monitoring convinced the participants that the risk of exposure was still present 
in this situation. Perhaps they feared they were being recorded, or their movements on the 
mental math task were being scrutinized. If so, then it is probable that, even though they 
had a high propensity to be dishonest, they thought it better to be honest and not risk 
detection. Second, it is possible that the individuals saw the electronic monitoring as a 
cue that the task was very important to the monitor, or that the monitor was very 
concerned with their work. If individuals viewed the task as being important to someone 
then that may have decreased their propensity to be dishonest, even if they disliked the 
monitoring. Third, it is possible that the participants did not dislike the electronic 
monitoring as much as they disliked the human monitoring, leading to lower propensity 
to be dishonest. This explanation would not be consistent with past research and 
anecdotal evidence which shows electronic monitoring is more stressful than traditional 
human monitoring (Stanton 2000). Future research should be done in this area to 
determine the how individuals view different monitoring regimes, and how their views 
shape their attitudes towards different work behaviors. 
 In conclusion, the agency theory literature and fraud prevention literature rarely 
consider the negative effects of monitoring on the individual psyche. Usually, only the 
principal’s explicit monetary costs are considered when searching for the optimal amount 
of monitoring. This study, and others, suggest that there are significant “hidden costs” 




yet to be fully explored in the business literature. Since these costs and effects are mostly 
unknown, business researchers currently lack the ability to predict the effects of controls, 
or regulation, on behavior. In contrast, much more is known about other environmental 
effects on behavior, such as the effects of incentives on work performance (Bonner et al. 
2000), than is known about how individuals react to different types of internal controls. 
Following Christ et al. (2012), I believe that future research should further develop our 
understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls. 
 Further developing this line of research may yield important clues to long-
standing questions, such as why financial fraud is still persistent despite increases in 
regulation and ethics training (Rezaee 2005), why individuals display trustworthy 
behavior in certain situations and contractual arrangements but selfish behavior in others 
(Rankin et al. 2008), why individuals collude against control systems (Zhang 2008), and 
finally, why whistleblowing may be more likely in some environments or situations than 
others (Seifert et al. 2013). Using empirical evidence to address the questions will aid in 
the design of more effective internal controls (Sprinkle 2003), the development of more 
efficient contracts (Brown et al. 2009), and more comprehensive theoretical models for 












The standard principal-agent theory of the firm suggests the principal should seek 
to control the agent’s behavior (solve the agency problem) though either monitoring the 
agent’s performance or aligning the agent’s interest with the owner’s interest through the 
use of incentives.
36
 While there has been a wealth of interesting research on the effects of 
incentives on agent behavior (Bonner et al. 2000), less is known about the effects 
monitoring and control on the agent. This has led some to call for research that further 
develops our understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls (e.g., Christ 
et al. 2012). This three paper dissertation heeds this call.  
 Drawing on past literature, which suggests that agents have a disdain for control 
(Falk and Kosfield 2006) and find monitoring stressful (Stanton 2000), I formed 
hypotheses about how and why agents may react to various levels of monitoring. In short, 
the literature seems to suggest that, when all else is equal, monitoring should increase 
external motivation at the expense of internal motivation and reciprocity. This basic 
assumption motivated all three studies in this dissertation. The first study in this 
dissertation investigates the effects of monitoring intensity on discretionary effort, 
volunteer rates for an optional task, and effort spent on an optional task. The second 
study investigates the effects monitoring intensity on problem solving ability. The third 
study investigates the effects of monitoring intensity on behavioral honesty. 
                                                        
 
36
 In practice, most business arrangements seem to use a mix of incentive pay and monitoring. For 
example, Bulow and Summers’s (1986) model of dual labor markets is based on the assumption that if 
monitoring is difficult work conditions will be good and pay will be high, while if monitoring is easy, 




 Overall the results from the three studies seem to support the theory that increased 
monitoring intensity lowers internal motivation, although the results vary on different 
measures across the different types of monitoring environments (human monitoring or 
electronic monitoring). For example, in the first study I expected to find that monitoring 
intensity would be associated with lower discretionary effort, lower volunteer rates for 
optional tasks, and lower effort on optional tasks. While this is assumption was mostly 
correct, there does seem to be a more complicated relationship between volunteer rates 
for an optional task and monitoring intensity. It seems that in some cases high monitoring 
intensity causes volunteer rates for optional tasks to increase, perhaps because of a 
perceived loss of autonomy. In study two I expected to find that monitoring intensity 
would be associated with lower problem solving ability across all measures. While I 
found this to generally be the case, I also found that an individual’s confidence in their 
base ability interacted with the monitoring treatment to determine performance on 
complex problem solving.
37
 In study three I expected to find that, when given the 
opportunity to cheat, monitoring intensity would be associated with increased dishonesty. 
Again, generally I found this to be case. However, I did find that monitoring at the most 
intense levels seems to curtail dishonest behavior. 
While the topics in these studies are becoming increasingly important to 
researchers and practitioners, most of the ideas, methods, and psychological theories 
drawn on this dissertation are novel to the managerial accounting literature. The results of 
these experiments are not meant to be directly generalizable outside of a laboratory 
setting. Rather, these experiments, and their results, should be considered in the larger 
                                                        
 
37
 These findings are consistent with the theory of social facilitation, which details how individual 





frameworks of organizational theory, human psychology, and current practices. Taken 
together, the findings from this dissertation add to our understanding of the effects 
organizational controls on agent behavior and abilities. These findings also open up new 
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Short Demographics Questionnaire 
 
 
Circle all that apply to you 
 
1) I am:   Male   Female 
 
2) My age is :    Under 18            18 -24           Over 24 
 
3) I consider myself mostly an:    International Student         American Student      
Not a student 
 
4) I consider myself mostly:    A business student       Not a business student        
Not a student 
 
5) I am a:    Freshman/Sophomore             Junior/Senior            Graduate 
Student       Other 
 
6) I like to play sports or enjoy watching sports:    Yes      No        
 
7) I consider myself good with numbers and mental math:    Yes     No 
 
8) I am in a good mood (happy) today:   Yes      No 
 
9) I am tired today:   Yes    No           
 
Your answers on this form and your performance on the assigned tasks will remain 
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Street Address:           116 Craig RD
America's Math and Logic Puzzle Leader Invoice Due




      Name:                 Tiller Homeschool





Make all checks payable to
OTHER COMMENTS
1. Total payment due in 30 days
2. Please include the invoice number on your check
Education USA Inc.
If you have any questions about this invoice, please contact
Reggie Thomason - Customer Service Specialist -  1-800-296-0673 Ext. 8871





Example of Electronically Entered Data 
 
Invoice # Invoice Date Customer Name Street Address City Zip Code Item 1 SKU Description 1
Sample 12/13/2012 Davis Elmentary 3402 Honeycutt Lane Salem, AL 35444 72A Fuzzy Logic Concept
77613 12/14/2012 Tiller Homeschool 116 Craig RD Ft. Johntson, CO 80055 61D Weights and Measures
77614 12/14/2012 Gradar Academy 21 Shallow Hill Casper, WY 82717 11A Making Cents of Money
77616 12/15/2012 Hoover Baptist 3636 N. Applin St. Gary, IN 46335 31S Elementary Numerical Basics
77617 12/15/2012 Dallas East 303030 Caraway Ave. Dallas, TX 77231 80D Graphing, Charting, and Mapping
77618 12/15/2012 Sherry Henson 9911 W. Harrwood St. Junction City, SC 29563 07A Geometry, Shapes, and Spaces
77619 12/15/2012 Mathnasium of Boston 17454 Hickory Hill Ste. C Boston, MS 02103 63A Advanced Logic and Reasoning
77621 12/16/2012 Chambers and Sloan 71 Jersey Cir. Searcy, AR 72475 11A Making Cents of Money
77622 12/16/2012 Chambers and Sloan 71 Jersey Cir. Searcy, AR 74275 31S Elementary  Basics
77623 12/17/2012 Danny Fielder 403 Dr. Batesville, MS 38606 39D Plane Trigonometry II
77624 12/17/2012 Hillcrest Elementary 1324 Cresmont Dr. Greenville, LA 70856 3S1 Elementary Numerical Basics
77625 12/17/2012 Sherman Heights Prep 321 Dover Ave. Sistern, MA 05562 63A Advances In Logic and Reasoning
77627 12/17/2012 Cindy Shultz 112 East Bark St. Oakley, CA 90028 16C Power Reading
77629 12/18/2012 Amanda Milligan 245 Lowcust Dr. Caraway, AR 72419 22B Fractions and Algebraic Equations
77629 12/18/2012 Crystal Sullivan 13615 Widover Ave. Quinten, OK 73472 72A Fuzzy Logic Concepts
77630 12/18/2022 Josh Blackburn 203 Park East Circle Bedford, OH 44146 29A Fundamental Problem Solving
77633 12/19/2012 Pathways Academy 2123 South Bender Ave. Lafe, KY 42788 87A Math Music
77634 12/19/2012 Pathways Academy 2123 South Bender Ave. Lafe, KY 42788 11A Making Cents of Money
77635 12/19/2012 Shae Brewer 6667 South Mendall Carthage, MO 63197 57B Linear Equations and Inequalities
77637 12/19/2012 Margit Burkhart 901 Metzler Ave. New Haven, NJ 08912 33E Audio Books





One of Three Feedback Forms Used in the Optional Task 
 
  
Feedback Form 1 – Task 1 - Rating the person who entered the Data 
Rate the following statements Strongly 
Disagree 




1. The person who entered this 
data was careful and precise. 
     
2. The invoices were bounded in 
the folder neatly. 
     
3. The Excel spread sheet was 
neat and easy to read. 
     
4. I had to fix very few errors.      
5. Most errors were small errors 
such as missing decimals. 
     
6. There were about the same 
amount of errors on every 
invoice entered. 
     
7. The amount of errors per 
invoice was about the same at 
the beginning of my work as 
the end of my work.  
     
8. I would recommend the person 
who entered the data for more 
work in this area. 










Appendix F  











































Matrix task for testing honesty 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.84 8.99 7.24
2.38 7.68 6.65
9.60 8.56 5.47
1.01 1.76 3.92
3.36 4.20 0.06
1.57 8.39 3.35
0.61 1.43 5.29
8.43 6.97 6.75
7.46 0.78 1.08
9.97 3.02 1.89
5.21 0.64 7.27
9.22 7.87 2.29
7.21 3.24 3.31
1.10 8.12 9.00
7.10 7.12 7.75
5.13 8.90 3.80
7.48 4.98 5.32
7.11 2.94 6.92
2.52 9.49 8.57
2.69 3.86 6.01
6.00 6.23 4.94
8.83 9.01 7.96
0.86 4.04 0.99
4.25 1.42 6.06
0.48 6.40 8.36
2.42 9.72 6.92
5.21 2.57 7.65
9.81 1.64 3.58
1.51 3.64 1.86
7.19 7.13 4.56
1.48 7.09 2.96
2.30 8.18 8.14
7.80 3.12 3.59
1.34 9.81 2.96
2.86 4.42 9.31
6.88 6.44 5.67
3.84 8.22 1.97
5.48 6.98 5.77
8.03 1.31 0.92
6.37 6.59 0.28
0.12 8.07 2.02
1.71 2.20 3.44
8.88 9.96 8.29
9.18 8.92 1.17
1.82 2.44 7.36
1.10 8.87 3.37
8.02 1.93 9.16
2.49 1.97 2.64
1.09 5.74 3.45
8.82 6.53 6.44
5.12 7.01 4.31
6.55 5.63 8.83
4.95 2.10 7.65
9.02 8.33 2.97
9.61 5.61 9.61
2.12 5.52 5.05
9.44 6.71 4.29
6.93 9.34 1.28
8.36 6.85 9.28
0.56 8.89 4.92
